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*The* AMERICAN REVIEW

VOLUME NINE NUMBER THREE

SEPTEMBER 1937

# The Totalitarian Régimes

## *An Essay in Essential Distinctions*

Ross J. S. HOFFMAN

THE journalists and historians of liberal bias, who write most of the current literature treating of the new totalitarian and authoritarian states of Europe, are instructing American readers today in a new and but lately acquired doctrine. It is this: that the conflict of Fascism and Communism (which until almost yesterday many of these writers were declaring in high alarm to be the exclusive set of alternatives confronting the bankrupt order of capitalist liberalism) is a sham conflict, that these things are at bottom identical, and that the real issue is now seen clearly to be democracy *versus* dictatorship. This, we are told, is the essential distinction, and therefore the truly significant classification of political communities today.

On the one hand, say these writers (Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Albert Jay Nock, James Truslow Adams, Westbrook Pegler – that rigorous thinker! – and countless others), you have popular representative government, under which liberty obtains and men are citizens who cannot be arbitrarily robbed, beaten,

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exiled, murdered, or even indoctrinated (the supreme infamy!) by irresponsible state bosses. On the other hand you have despotic political terrorism under which the citizen is but a miserable subject with no voice in making the decisions of the state and no means for resisting its tyranny. It is *We or They*, as Mr. Armstrong defined the issue in his popular little book of last year. Ideological differences to be sure exist amongst these tyrannies, but are without important significance, since in reality the Fascist-Communist alternative is a Hobson's choice. The vital issue and therefore the essential line of distinction is dictatorship or democracy. "The former may be an autocracy or an oligarchy," says Mr. Adams. "It may be communistic in its stated philosophy, as in Russia, or Nazi as in Germany, or Fascist as in Italy, or something else as in the many dictator countries in Europe. But in whatever guise it may cloak itself, its outstanding feature is that the ordinary citizen comes to have practically nothing to say about the government or laws under which he lives."

I chose that text almost at random. Scores of American publicists have said and are saying every day the same thing, almost in the same words. And indeed it is not surprising that liberal writers should come at length to this judgement of the political scene. They hated instinctively the thing called Fascism from the moment of its appearance and now the news out of Russia is fast dispelling last illusions about "the great social experiment". The Bolshevik *Realpolitikers*, it appears, are getting rid of some of the more objectionable ideologues, the soldier and bureaucrat have returned to power, and the Cossack is once more in

his saddle. Wherefore does Russia begin again to look scandalously like herself and hence to stink as of old in all liberal nostrils; wherefore has one more effort to create a terrestrial Utopia issued in the common sort of despotism that callously exterminates those unfortunate ones who annoy it. This fact, it is sad to remember, many liberals were unable to perceive for so long as the Moscow terror was visited primarily upon reactionary peasants and priests. But they see it now and shrink back in horror, cursing the whole Bolshevik business as Fascism in a red disguise. And that this should be their ultimate reaction to the state of Stalin and Voroshilov is not, I repeat, surprising, because the detestation of arms and personal authority – no less than hatred of brutality and despotism – is a mark of the liberal mind.

But the main reason why the liberal writers see Bolshevism, National Socialism, and Fascism as compounded of the same essential stuff is to be found in the subjective test which they apply in making their political distinctions and classifications. To the real liberal there are only two kinds of rule in the state: that which limits his liberty to do what he pleases and that which does not. For at heart he is anti-state; that is, however much he may approve (for reasons of social utility) the expansion of administration, he dislikes genuine politics and inclines toward Mr. Nock's anarchistic doctrine of the state as man's enemy. For he cannot abide independent political authority, capable of coercion, and therefore with power to rule. That is "dictatorship", and to him dictators, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin – yes, even the debonair Mr. Roosevelt – all look alike.

Nor is the liberal alone in holding this view. Many unpolitically minded clericals share it, being ever wary of the state as a potential enemy of the Church, and conceiving the essential nature of any political régime to be found in its attitude toward clerical privilege. Indeed, if clericalism be defined (as I think it should) as that kind of political activity which is exclusively preoccupied with defending clerical persons from any subjection to secular authority, then plainly it is somewhat analogous with liberalism. Each is anti-state, in that each regards the state rather as an unfortunate necessity than as a positive and desirable good. So it is that to many Catholics also the new authoritarian régimes appear as merely different brands of the same offensive commodity. Thus Mr. Raoul Desvernine, Catholic and Liberty League propagandist, repeatedly attacks our new Federal state with its positive policies for the national welfare as a potential enemy of religious liberty. He believes that President Roosevelt has set us on a course that leads to totalitarianism, which in his judgement is everywhere the same essential thing. "Communism, Nazism, and Fascism", he told the Catholic Summer School at Cliff Haven this year, "are the expressions of the same fundamental philosophy – the absolute supremacy of the state over the political, social, economic, cultural, and religious life of the individual." The common denominator and essential stuff of all three despotic systems is, he believes, the worship of the omnipotent state.

Very much the same viewpoint has been expressed by Dr. Paul Kiniery, of Loyola University, in a recent essay in *The Catholic World*.

Fascism [he wrote] is essentially as materialistic as

Communism. Fascism has no more respect for the dignity of the individual than has Communism. Under Fascism the state is deified almost to the same extent that it is under Communism. . . . The upper and middle classes have been exterminated under Communism. Under Fascism they are exploited out of existence. One process is rapid; the other is slower. . . . From these remarks it would appear that Communism and Fascism, while they may appear to be so opposed to one another that even the world cannot contain both simultaneously have in reality so much in common that neither can be acceptable to us. . . . Each of the two systems tends to be anti-religious as a matter of policy and as a means of strengthening the state. Any organization which makes the slightest claim to the service of the individual is an enemy of the all-powerful state. . . . Communism and Fascism have both been militaristic. Each is a threat to the peace of the world. . . . Each one, with its advocacy of totalitarianism, is a long step backward in the path which mankind has been travelling toward a better life. . . . Communism and Fascism are in reality two roads to the same goal; ruin and the utter destruction of everything that a true Catholic and an upright American citizen holds beyond price.

Now it is not the main purpose of this essay to join issue with these writers over the merits or demerits of Communism, National Socialism, and Fascism. For all that concerns us here, these may very well be a trinity of evils which good Catholics and good Americans will be wise to shun. Neither is there here any wish to deny that the democracy *versus* dictatorship issue is a real issue, although I should prefer to call this the issue of genuine government *versus* anarchy. The purpose is rather to insist that this subjectivist view of the new states is not a clear view, and that in it there is

that common weakness of thought which issues in failure to perceive essential distinctions of category, in the invention of false distinctions or undue emphasis upon those of minor significance, and therefore in the drawing of a veil of obscurity over reality. Communism, National Socialism, and Fascism may indeed be evil; they may be equally evil; they may have numerous affinities and similarities; but they are essentially different and cannot be resolved by the same common denominator. To establish that as truth is the aim of this essay.

## II

Now the argument is not to be made by drawing out the numerous ideological differences and insisting upon the determinative importance of these. Ideologies have indeed proved themselves to be, as Waldemar Gurian insisted in his *Future of Bolshevism*, instruments for party control of the state and the masses, rather than intellectual convictions firmly held or social objectives resolutely pursued. Moreover, it may be said that the essential nature of any historical activity is never to be found wholly in the sphere of ideas, since men are moved by passion and appetite even more strongly than by ideal forces. No, it will not do to contrast, say, the twenty-five point program of the Nazis with the Communist Manifesto and affirm that therein lies the essential difference between the two things which Berlin and Moscow represent today.

But if, instead of ideological systems, we consider certain attitudes of mind, which predispose men to accept this or that ideology, and certain fundamental assumptions, on which the ideologies are based, we can

then, I think, lay hold on some genuinely essential distinctions.

Let us do this with respect to the state and the concepts men have of the rôle and proper purposes of the state in the social community. Why does it exist? Is it of temporary or permanent social necessity? Is it an indispensable evil or a positive good? Is it autonomous and sovereign within its sphere, or is it rather an instrument for use by an authority of higher command? Men give differing answers to these questions, very much as they do when similar questions are put concerning the Church; for they believe or disbelieve in the state, and oppose or tolerate or warmly accept it, in accordance with their fundamental attitudes and mental postulates, even as they reject, tolerate, or accept the Church. Thus the anarchist regards the state as a coercive weapon of the exploiting class, therefore as an enemy of the human community, an evil thing which should be destroyed. And he takes this view because of his underlying assumption of the perfectibility of men once all restraints on them have been removed. He pursues, in other words, a vision that is ultimately derivative from and dependent on a certain concept of the nature of man and society.

The liberal, with his distrust of strong and extensive government, tends toward a similar although less extreme position; for he regards the state as potentially hostile to the most precious individual liberties and affirms therefore that the best government is the least government. He will not admit, with Aristotle, that the purpose of the state is to promote the virtue of men, but will say, with Locke, that it exists to defend their private autonomies. So does he view it as an in-

dispensable evil rather than as a positive good. Moreover, he does not think of the state as an independent and autonomous authority in the community, but as an agency to do the bidding of the several private autonomies that constitute the community. Thus he thinks of the state rather as *administration* than as *government* and has a strongly nominalist concept of it, tending to deny it all corporate reality, tending also to deny that it can properly have interests of its own higher than and differing from the sum of private interests that sustain it.

Such are the assumptions on which the liberal mind, more often than not unwittingly, poses its political beliefs. The individual is taken as the sole reality of society, and the whole business of politics is to serve not his true needs (of which he may be but dimly aware) but his expressed wishes; which leads in logic to such a view of the state as Mr. Rudolf Rocker recently expressed in his *Nationalism and Culture*: "The history of the state is the history of human oppression. . . . Let us not deceive ourselves: it is not the form of the state, it is the state itself which creates the evil and continually nourishes and fosters it." Liberalism, in reality, wants no state, but only administration; it is at bottom anarchistic in tendency and therefore essentially anti-political in character. It conceives the state as an instrument in the service of private interests and appetites, not as the guardian and promoter of the general community good.

But to conserve and advance this latter is the very essence of genuine politics, and those who, in allegiance to the central political tradition of Western civilization, perceive and acknowledge this truth do

so from a quite different set of postulates. For not only do they recognize the organic nature of society and the abstract reality of the state, but they affirm the political nature of man and the consequent necessity of the state in the human community – and not as an indispensable evil but as a positive good, without which man would be something less than man. Such postulates are at bottom religious, which is the reason why we may say that differing conceptions of the nature and purposes of the state set men in fundamental opposition one to another no less than do differing religions. For in truth all political differences which cut deeply are rooted in opposing visions of reality. This we shall see in contrasting the Communist, Nazi, and Fascist concepts of the state.

## III

The contrast is best seen, I believe, by examining into the party-state relations in these so-called totalitarian régimes. Let us do this now, considering first the Soviet Union, where the Marxian doctrine of the state reigns as political orthodoxy.

This doctrine derives from the class-struggle interpretation of history and social development, in which the state appears as a weapon forged by the exigencies of an unceasing war of classes for possession of the means of economic production. The owner-exploiter class devised the state to defend its hold on productive property, and the exploited class seeks ever to wrest away this weapon. The conflict is the dynamic principle of history, a process which is to culminate in the proletarian capture of the state and, by coercive use of it, the establishment of a universal, classless, Com-

munist society; whereupon, its destiny fulfilled, the state "withers away" in Utopian anarchy and the atheistic kingdom of man over all reality.

It is thus plain that Communism as a doctrine is essentially anti-political in the meaning that I have here attached to that adjective. It denies the permanent necessity and positive good of the state in the social community, and it denies to the state an autonomous sovereignty within its own sphere, affirming on the contrary that it is properly an instrument for use by an authority of higher command. That authority, separate and external to the state, is the Party: executive of the sovereign proletarian will and custodian of an orthodox ideology.

Now this minority group may or may not care sincerely about their professed ideology and ideal social objectives; but there can be no doubt that the Party does determine the purposes and ends of political activity. It does fix social doctrine; it does determine education; it does lay its ruling hand upon all institutional agencies that form new human generations. Nor is there any aspect of cultural activity, of the life of the mind and spirit, over which it disclaims the right to rule; since questions of religion and transcendental reality, no less than secular matters, come within the scope of its affirmations. Soviet society is thus ruled by the Party rather than the state, and the position of the Party is perfectly analogous to that of a Church in a theocratic order, as, for example, early Calvinist society wherein the ecclesiastical power was above the civil and utilized the latter as an instrumental means for establishing the reign of the saints. It is true, of course, as I have already pointed out, that signs now

appear indicating the gradual emancipation of Stalinist Russia from Party rule and the return of the state to the exercise of its own independent authority. But it is still too early to say that this has actually come about. Stalin still rules as master of the Party rather than as head of the state, and his successive bloody purges are not to be interpreted as the subjection of Party to state but as disciplinary actions within the Party. Bolshevism has not yet become genuinely political, and we do not know that it will ever issue as such.

Now in turning to the Nazi Reich we are quickly struck by a meaningful similarity to Bolshevism with respect to party and state relations. And herein lies a deep affinity between Communism and National Socialism which it is not my intention to deny. To be sure, there is no clear Nazi doctrine of the state comparable to the Marxist doctrine, but National Socialism has also an anti-political character in that it views the state as primarily a revolutionary instrument at the service of the Party. As Professor Henri Lichtenberger, in his admirable *The Third Reich*, has said:

> Hitler was guided above all by a principle which lay at the very base of his conception of the National Socialist Revolution: his conception of the necessary dualism of state and party. National Socialism for Hitler rested fundamentally on a *Weltanschauung*. "The National Socialist idea," he said, "has its organizing base in the Party." The Party represents "the political conscience, the political conceptions, and the political will of the nation." It is the Party which has placed the state at the service of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*, and it is the Party which ought to set the final goals in all domains of life and harmonize public life with national duty.

Plainly this means that the Party is neither within the state nor subject to its disciplinary action, but is something apart from and necessarily superior to the state. Hitler has affirmed that "all Germans are to be formed by the ideological principles of National Socialism, that the better National Socialists are to become members of the Party, and that, finally, the better members of the Party are to assume direction of the state". To the *Führer*, therefore, the Party has not been and is not to be a mere instrumental activity of the nation for rebuilding and vindicating the sovereign autonomy of the state; but is instead an independent, all-powerful organism determining the ends of political activity, doctrine, education, and the life of the mind and spirit.

Thus the National Socialist Party, like the Communist Party, does not dedicate itself to a mission primarily political, but undertakes to create a new cultural life and to indoctrinate the mind of society with a particular view of reality. Its stated ideology may be the merest rubbish and with no great significance in determining the concrete acts of government, but the *Weltanschauung* on which that ideology reposes is of fundamental and decisive importance in fixing the nature of National Socialism, which is at bottom a religious manifestation. Pantheistic racialism, subjectivist mysticism, these are the underlying assumptions and mental attitudes of a Germany in revolt against both the Catholic and Jacobin-Marxist traditions. It would be lacking in rigor of thought, therefore, to adopt unreservedly the view of Dr. Gurian that Bolshevism and National Socialism are fundamentally one thing because each affirms that the supreme end of

human activity is service to the social-political order and the realization of a particular social ideal. These movements are expressions of differing affirmations of the nature of reality, of opposing mental attitudes and postulates.

I should prefer to say that what we have in them are two heresies which differ deeply in spirit but yet have a great deal in common, as indeed have all great heretical revolts against the Catholic tradition. And their chief common feature is precisely this theocratic form which each inevitably assumes. For the National Socialist Party in Germany, like its spiritual opposite in Russia, has a position in society analogous with a church in a theocratic order. True it is that the law of December 1st, 1933, declared the Party to be "the very incarnation of the idea of the state" and to be "indissolubly united to the state", but this union is not a merging of identities, still less a subordination of the Party to the state. This has neither come nor given sign of coming. And therefore the Nazi movement remains without a primarily political character, in which fact one may discern, not to be sure its identity, but certainly its near affinity with Russian Communism.

We come now to Italian Fascism and to perceive therein a profound and essential difference, not only from Bolshevism but also from the falsely called Fascism of Germany. For Italian Fascism does possess a primarily political character and cannot in any way be described as a religious movement. It has neither ideology nor *Weltanschauung* that can be called peculiarly its own; and in Italy there is no party rule of the state.

The Fascist Party arose within the framework of

parliamentary liberalism and therein attacked the old party conflict as destructive of the authority of the state. It warred upon the party system and for long was even reluctant to take the name of party for itself. It was devoid of dogma and fixed vision of any particular social ideal; it was therefore thoroughly pragmatist and without any other program than to deal practically with concrete problems as they arose. Thus in 1919 when Mussolini founded the *Fascio di Combattimento* at Milan and began to draw into a union other *Fasci*, springing up spontaneously over the country, he declared: "The *Fasci* are not, do not wish to be, and cannot become a party. The *Fasci* are a temporary organization of all those who accept specific solutions of specific present problems." A year later he wrote that the *Fasci* neither could nor should be a party because they did not feel themselves tied "to any specific doctrine or dogma". He spoke of his followers rather as "an athletic body of free men" and called them the "gypsies of Italian politics". To be sure he presently went on to the formation of a political party and to the adoption of a party program, but the movement never lost its opportunist and undogmatic character. "What do we propose?" he asked rhetorically in 1921 (after the Party had come into being). "We say it without false modesty: to govern the nation. With what program? With the program necessary to assure the moral and material greatness of the Italian people."

This movement was thus exclusively political, and if it had also an economic and ethical significance, that is only because political activity properly includes an economic and ethical mission. But it made no religious

affirmation, nor had it any concept of reality and of human nature to propagate as its own. It therefore was not a new religion, and the Duce declared many times that the Party is "not a Church". That is the reason why Fascism has not resulted in either a party-state dualism or in a party-dominated state. For once the revolution had created the new Fascist State, the Party came within the state and passed under its authority. Within three years after the march on Rome this relationship had been established in fact, and when, in 1928, the Party was merged juridically with the state by the assignment of a constitutional position to the Grand Fascist Council, the state had absorbed the Party in law as well as in fact. So that we find these words in the preamble of the revised Party constitution of 1929: "The National Fascist Party is a civil militia, at the service of the state [*al servizio dello Stato*]. Its objective is to realize the greatness of the Italian people." The Party is, in short, nothing more than an organ of the state for defense, political education, social services, and recruitment of state officers. The small volume entitled *Il Partito Nazionale Fascista*, published by the Party last year in its series of *Testi per i corsi di preparazione politica* makes this fact perfectly clear.

To re-establish the autonomous state as the directing intelligence of the secular life of the national community, that sums up the whole of the Fascist mission, which has been happily free of strange dogmas concerning the mysteries of reality. It has dealt with men as they are rather than as perhaps they should be; and it evinced from the start that concrete intelligence which recognizes politics as the art of the possible.

Hence its realism combined with its exclusively political character to afford it escape from those clashes with traditional religion which, from their inner essential nature, neither National Socialism nor Communism can avoid.

Such is the gulf that separates the Fascist State from the totalitarian régimes of northern and eastern Europe. Hitler is a prophet and Stalin is a pope of the modern Muscovite religion, but Mussolini is a man of tradition with whom Aristotle or St. Thomas or Machiavelli might without too great difficulty feel at ease; and the essential characters of the three régimes are faithfully reflected in their respective leaders. Liberals who say all these things are one, and who can discern no essential distinction among modern states save that of dictatorship and democracy, simply make confusion of categories and miss seeing the boundary line between politics and religion.

## IV

In the light of things present, and with knowledge of experience in the past, several indications for the future of these totalitarian régimes may be read with some measure of confidence.

There will probably come in Russia and Germany a gradual reduction of the Party to state obedience, or to some subordinate position like that which the Party has already willingly assumed in Italy. We might almost say, indeed, that unless the Nazi and Communist régimes are violently destroyed, this development is inevitable; since all such religious movements in the past have been brought at length under the dominion of their own political instruments. It is in their nature

to be either subdued or destroyed by that which they create. Thus Protestantism called upon secular power to vindicate itself against the papal Church and presently found that it had raised up not a servant but a master. Revolutionary Jacobinism not only created but was mastered by what it made, the Napoleonic state; and we might cite other examples to show that such a development lies in the very logic of events. For although the revolutionary party, with its *Weltanschauung* and ideology, creates the state anew as its instrument of advance, the men of the state discover sooner or later that if they would govern successfully they must deal with facts instead of theories. Their political action must pass from the abstract to the concrete; they must face reality and deal with society as it is rather that as they have ideologically conceived it to be. Dogmatic thought, proper indeed in revealed religion, is soon found to be too stiffly narrow for an effective grappling with that diversity and complexity which marks all social life. And when this discovery is made, the men of the state, holding the instruments of power, turn upon the ideologues.

Then the party goes under. But all depends of course upon the vitality of whatever new religion the party has striven to implant in the minds of men. For so long as this is strong and enduring the party will keep the upper hand. So may we be reasonably certain that neither Russia nor Germany will be delivered from party rule until their present insane religions have been exploded in the general mind of society. Probably this process is now in course and we will see the ultimate passing of all pretense that the Soviet and Third Reich are anything other than the familiar

Russian and Prussian despotisms ruling over peoples who are sadly deficient in knowledge of human freedom.

But the outlook for Italy is not the same, because the destinies of Fascism are not linked with the fortunes of a heresy. There the state can adapt itself to changes in historical life; it is more flexible, more living, better related organically to a social life permeated with a consciousness of freedom, therefore more truly popular and less dependent on the person of the leader. Present indications are that the Fascist State will grow steadily less dictatorial as it consolidates its representative base anew on the corporate realities of Italian society. For Fascism, considered as an historical process in the life of Italy rather than as an irrational extravagance of revolutionary thought, is fundamentally Italian, Catholic, and realist, and hence linked inseparably with the soundest traditions of our civilization. He who has been formed by these should know the difference between what is merely strong government, competent to its task, and what is actual despotism.

But to the liberal, I fear, all this goes unperceived. And so will he doubtless continue his fight for democracy against dictatorship, not even suspecting the existence of the real issues which today divide the West.

# Maule's Curse

## *Hawthorne and the Problem of Allegory*

Yvor Winters

At the moment of execution – with the halter about his neck and while Colonel Pyncheon sat on horseback, grimly gazing at the scene – Maule had addressed him from the scaffold, and uttered a prophecy, of which history as well as fireside tradition, has preserved the very words. "God," said the dying man, pointing his finger, with a ghastly look, at the undismayed countenance of his enemy, "God will give him blood to drink!" – *The House of the Seven Gables.*

Of Hawthorne's three most important long works – *The Scarlet Letter*, *The House of the Seven Gables*, and *The Marble Faun* – the first is pure allegory, and the other two are impure novels, or novels with unassimilated moral elements. The first is faultless, in scheme and in detail; it is one of the chief masterpieces of English prose. The second and third are interesting, the third in particular, but both are failures, and neither would suffice to give the author a very high place in the history of prose fiction. Hawthorne's sketches and short stories, at best, are slight performances; either they lack meaning, as in the case of *Mr. Higginbotham's Catastrophe*, or they lack reality of embodiment, as in the case of *The Birthmark*, or, having a measure of both, as does *The Minister's Black Veil*, they yet seem incapable of justifying the intensity of the method, their very brevity and attendant simplification, perhaps, working against them. The

best of them, probably, is *Young Goodman Brown.* In his later romances, *Septimius Felton, Dr. Grimshaw's Secret, The Ancestral Footstep,* and *The Dolliver Romance*, and in much of *The Blithedale Romance* as well, Hawthorne struggles unsuccessfully with the problem of allegory, but he is still obsessed with it.

Hawthorne is, then, essentially an allegorist; had he followed the advice of Poe and other well-wishers, contemporary with himself and posthumous, and thrown his allegorizing out the window, it is certain that nothing essential to his genius would have remained within. He appears to have had none of the personal qualifications of a novelist, for one thing: the somber youth who lived in solitude and in contemplation in Salem, for a dozen years or more, before succumbing to the charms and propinquity of Miss Sophia Peabody and making the spasmodic and only moderately successful efforts to accustom himself to daylight which were to vex the remainder of his life, was one far more likely to concern himself with the theory of mankind than with the chaos, trivial, brutal, and exhausting, of the actuality. Furthermore, as we shall see more fully, the Puritan view of life was allegorical, and the allegorical vision seems to have been strongly impressed upon the New England literary mind. It is fairly obvious in much of the poetry of Emerson, Emily Dickinson, Bryant, Holmes, and even Very – Whittier, a Quaker and a peasant, alone of the more interesting poets escaping; Melville, relatively an outsider, shows the impact of New England upon his own genius as much through his use of allegory as through his use of New England character;

and the only important novelist, purely a New Englander, aside from Hawthorne, that is, O. W. Holmes, was primarily concerned with the Puritan tendency to allegory, as its one considerable satirist, yet was himself more or less addicted to it.

These matters are speculative. That New England predisposed Hawthorne to allegory cannot be shown; yet the disposition in both is obvious. And it can easily be shown that New England provided the perfect material for one great allegory, and that, in all likelihood, she was largely to blame for the later failures.

The Puritan theology rested primarily upon the doctrine of predestination and of the inefficaciousness of good works; it separated men sharply and certainly into two groups, the saved and the damned, and, technically, at least, was not concerned with any subtler shadings. This in itself represents a long step toward the allegorization of experience, for a very broad abstraction is substituted for the patient study of the minutiae of moral behavior long encouraged by Catholic tradition. Another step was necessary, however, and this step was taken in Massachusetts almost at the beginning of the settlement, and in the expulsion of Anne Hutchinson became the basis of governmental action: whereas the wholly Calvinistic Puritan denied the value of the evidence of character and behavior as signs of salvation, and so precluded the possibility of their becoming allegorical symbols, for the orthodox Calvinist, such as Mrs. Hutchinson would appear to have been, who trusted to no witness save that of the Inner Light, it became customary to regard as evidence of salvation the decision of the individual to enter the Church and lead a moral life.

The Puritans [says Henry Bamford Parkes (*Hound and Horn*, Winter, 1932)] were plain blunt men with little taste for mysticism and no talent for speculation. A new conception was formulated by English theologians, of whom William Ames was the most influential. The sign of election was not an inner assurance; it was a sober decision to trust in Christ and obey God's law. Those who made this sober decision might feel reasonably confident that they had received God's grace; but the surest proof of it was its fruit in conduct; complete assurance was impossible. It was assumed that all was the work of grace; it was God, without human cooperation, who caused the sober decision to be made. But in actual practice this doctrine had the effect of unduly magnifying man's ability to save himself, as much as Calvin's conception had unduly minimized it; conversion was merely a choice to obey a certain code of rules, and did not imply any emotional change, any love for God, or for holiness, or any genuine religious experience; religion in other words was reduced to mere morality.

Objective evidence thus took the place of inner assurance, and the behavior of the individual took on symbolic value. That is, any sin was evidence of damnation; or, in other words, any sin represented all sin. When Hester Prynne committed adultery, she committed an act as purely representative of complete corruption as the act of Faustus in signing a contract with Satan. This view of the matter is certainly not Catholic and is little short of appalling; it derives from the fact, that although there occurred an exaggeration of the will in the matter of practical existence, this same will was still denied in the matter of doctrine, for according to doctrine that which man willed had been previously willed by God.

The belief that the judgement of man is predestined by God, and the corollary that the judgement of a good man, since all men are either good or bad, purely and simply, is the will of God, may lead in the natural course of events to extraordinary drama; and this the more readily if the actors in the drama are isolated from the rest of the world and believe that the drama in which they take part is of cosmic importance and central in human destiny. In *The Colonial Period of American History*, Charles M. Andrews writes:

> The belief that God had selected New England as the chosen land was profoundly held by the Puritans who went there. Winthrop himself in 1640 wrote to Lord Saye and Sele of "this good land which God hath found and given to his people", adding that "God had chosen this country to plant his people in". Cotton in his sermon, *God's Promise to His Plantation* (London, 1634), devotes much space to the same idea – "This place is appointed me of God."

And H. W. Schneider writes on the same subject in *The Puritan Mind*:

> No one can live long in a Holy Commonwealth without becoming sensitive, irritable, losing his sense of values and ultimately his balance. All acts are acts either of God or of the devil; all issues are matters of religious faith; and all conflicts are holy wars. No matter how trivial an opinion might appear from a secular point of view, it became vital when promulgated as a theological dogma; no matter how harmless a fool might be, he was intolerable if he did not fit into the Covenant of Grace; no matter how slight an offense might be, it was a sin against Almighty God and hence infinite. Differences of

opinion became differences of faith. Critics became blasphemers, and innovators, heretics.

. . . The mind of the Puritan was singularly unified and his imagination thoroughly moralized. The clergy were, of course, the professional moral scientists, but the laymen were no less dominated by such mental habits. The common man and illiterate shared with the expert this interest in divining God's purposes in the course of events. No event was merely natural; it was an act of God and was hence charged with that "numinous" quality which gives birth to both prophetic insight and mystic illumination. . . .

Nature was instructive to them only in so far as it suggested the hidden mysterious operations of designing agents. God and devil were both active, scheming, hidden powers, each pursuing his own ends by various ministrations, and natural events were therefore to be understood only in so far as they showed evidence of some divine or diabolical plot.

Now according to the doctrine of predestination, if we interpret it reasonably, Hester merely gave evidence, in committing adultery, that she had always been one of the damned. This point of view, if really understood, could never have led to the chain of events which Hawthorne described in *The Scarlet Letter*; neither could it have led to the events of the actual history of New England. It is at this point that we must consider that fluid element, history, in connection with dogma, for Hester, like the witches who so occupied the Mathers, was treated as if she had willfully abandoned the ways of God for the ways of Satan. This final illogicality introduces the element of drama into the allegory of *The Scarlet Letter* and into the allegorical morality of the Puritans.

The English Puritans who settled Massachusetts were socially the product of centuries of the type of ethical discipline fostered by the Catholic and Anglo-Catholic Churches. They may have denied the freedom of the will and the efficaciousness of good works by lip, but by habit, and without really grasping the fact, they believed in them and acted upon them. Edwards exhorted sinners to repent while preaching the doctrine of the inability to repent; the Mathers wrestled with demons physically and in broad daylight, and quite obviously felt virtuous for having done so; in fact, to such a pass did Puritanism come, that Melville's Ahab, who willfully embarks upon the Sea of Unpredictability in order to overtake and slay the Spirit of Evil – an effort to which he is predestined and at the end of which he is predestined to destruction – appears to us merely the heroic projection of a common Puritan type. In fact, the Puritan may be said to have conceived the Manichean struggle between Absolute Good and Absolute Evil, which he derived through the processes of simplification and misunderstanding which have already been enumerated, as a kind of preordained or mechanical, yet also holy, combat, in which his own part was a part at once intense and holy and yet immutably regulated.

There were at least two motives in the new environment which tended to intensify the effect of habit in this connection: one was the inevitable impulse given to the will by the exaltation attendant upon a new religious movement; the other was the impulse given by the supremely difficult physical surroundings in which the new colonists found themselves. Frank Hugh Foster in his history of New England theology writes:

The first Puritans, sure in their own hearts that they were the elect of God, found the doctrine necessary to sustain them in the tremendous struggle through which they passed. . . . Hence the doctrine nerved to greater activity; and it produced a similar effect during the first period of the promulgation of Calvinism, among every nation which accepted the system.

The force of the will was strengthened at the beginning, at the same time that its existence was denied and that reliance upon its manner of functioning (that is, upon good works) was, from a doctrinal standpoint, regarded as sin. The will, highly stimulated, but no longer studied and guided by the flexible and sensitive ethical scholarship of the Roman tradition, might easily result in dangerous action.

Professor Andrews adverts to this subject as follows:

The dynamic agency . . . the driving force which overrode all opposition, legal and otherwise, was the profound conviction of the Puritan leaders that they were doing the Lord's work. They looked upon themselves as instruments in the divine hand for the carrying out of a great religious mission, the object of which was the rebuilding of God's church in a land – the undefiled land of America – divinely set apart as the scene of a holy experiment that should renovate the church at large, everywhere corrupt and falling into ruins. This new and purified community was to be the home of a saving remnant delivered from the wrath to come and was to serve as an example to the mother church of a regenerated form of faith and worship. It was also to become a proselyting center for the conversion of the heathen and the extension of the true gospel among those who knew it not. In the fulfillment of this mission the Puritans counted ob-

stacles, moral and physical, of no moment. Theirs was a religious duty to frustrate their enemies, to eradicate all inimical opinions, religious and political, and to extend the field of their influence as widely as possible. Once they had determined on their rules of polity and conduct, as laid down in the Bible and interpreted by the clergy, they had no doubts of the justness and rightness of their course. The means employed might savor of harshness and inequity, but at all costs and under all circumstances, error, sin, and idolatry, in whatever form appearing and as determined by themselves, must be destroyed. In the process, as events were to prove, a great many very human motives played an important part in interpreting the law of God, and personal likes and dislikes, hypocrisy, prejudice, and passion got badly mixed with the higher and more spiritual impulses that were actively at work purging the church of its errors.

Over a long period, however, the doctrine of predestination would naturally lead to religious apathy, for it offered no explicit motive to action; and this is precisely that to which it led, for after the Great Awakening of the middle of the eighteenth century, itself a reaction to previous decay in the Church, the Church lost power rapidly, and by the opening of the nineteenth century was succumbing on every hand to Unitarianism, a mildly moralistic creed, in which the element of supernaturalism was minimized, and which, in turn, yielded rapidly among the relatively intellectual classes to Romantic ethical theory, especially as propounded by the Transcendentalists. "It has never been a good way to induce men to repent," says Foster, "to tell them that they cannot." Or at least the method has never been highly successful except when employed by a rhetorician of the power of

Edwards, or by an orator of the effectiveness of Whitefield; and the effect can scarcely be expected long to outlive the immediate presence of the speaker. The Unitarians, in depriving the ethical life of the more impressive aspects of its supernatural sanction, and in offering nothing to take the place of that sanction, all but extinguished intensity of moral conviction, although their own conviction – we may see it portrayed, for example, in *The Europeans*, by Henry James, and exemplified in the lucid and classical prose of W. E. Channing – was a conviction, at least for a period, of the greatest firmness and dignity.

Emerson eliminated the need of moral conviction and of moral understanding alike, by promulgating the allied doctrines of equivalence and of inevitable virtue. In an Emersonian universe there is equally no need and no possibility of judgement; it is a universe of amiable but of perfectly unconscious imbeciles; it is likewise a universe in which the art of the fictionist – or for that matter, any other art – can scarcely be expected to flourish. A fictionist who has been in any considerable measure affected by Emersonian or allied concepts, or even who is the product of the historical sequence which gave rise to Emerson, is likely to find himself gravely confused and may even find himself paralyzed; and we have only to read such a document, to cite a single example, as *The New Adam and Eve*, to realize that Hawthorne's own moral ideas, in spite of his intense but conflicting moral sentiments, and in spite of his professed dislike for Emerson's philosophy, were closer to those of Emerson than of Edwards.

Now, in examining Hawthorne, we are concerned with two historical centers: that of the first generation

of Puritans in New England, in which occurs the action of *The Scarlet Letter*; and that of the post-Unitarian and Romantic intellectuals, in which was passed the life of Hawthorne.

Hawthorne, by nature an allegorist, and a man with a strong moral instinct, regardless of the condition of his ideas, found in the early history of his own people and region the perfect material for a masterpiece. By selecting sexual sin as the type of all sin, he was true alike to the exigencies of drama and of history. In the setting which he chose, allegory was realism, the idea was life itself; and his prose, always remarkable for its polish and flexibility, and stripped, for once, of all superfluity, was reduced to the living idea; it intensified pure exposition to a quality comparable in its way to that of great poetry.

The compactness and complexity of the allegory will escape all save the most watchful readers. Let us consider the following passage as a representative example. Hester has learned that the magistrates and clergy are considering whether or not she ought to be separated from her child, and she waits upon Governor Bellingham in order to plead with him:

> On the wall hung a row of portraits, representing the forefathers of the Bellingham lineage, some with armor on their breasts, and others with stately ruffs and robes of peace. All were characterized by the sternness and severity which old portraits so invariably put on; as if they were the ghosts, rather than the pictures, of departed worthies, and were gazing with harsh and intolerant criticism at the pursuits and enjoyments of living men.
>
> At about the center of the oaken panels, that lined the hall, was suspended a suit of mail, not, like the pictures, an ancestral relic, but of the most modern date; for it

had been manufactured by a skillful armorer in London, the same year in which Governor Bellingham came over to New England. There was a steel head-piece, a cuirass, a gorget, and greaves, with a pair of gauntlets and a sword hanging beneath; all, especially the helmet and breast-plate, so highly burnished as to glow with white radiance, and scatter an illumination everywhere about the floor. This bright panoply was not meant for mere idle show, but had been worn by the Governor on many a solemn muster and training field, and had glittered, moreover, at the head of a regiment in the Pequod war. For, though bred a lawyer, and accustomed to speak of Bacon, Coke, Noye, and Finch as his professional associates, the exigencies of this new country had transformed Governor Bellingham into a soldier as well as a statesman and ruler.

Little Pearl — who was as greatly pleased with the gleaming armor as she had been with the glittering frontispiece of the house — spent some time looking into the polished mirror of the breast-plate.

"Mother," cried she, "I see you here. Look! Look!"

Hester looked, by way of humoring the child; and she saw that, owing to the peculiar effect of the convex mirror, the scarlet letter was represented in gigantic and exaggerated proportions, so as to be greatly the most prominent feature of her appearance. In truth, she seemed absolutely hidden behind it. Pearl pointed upward, also, at a similar picture in the head-piece; smiling at her mother with the elfish intelligence that was so familiar an expression on her small physiognomy. That look of naughty merriment was likewise reflected in the mirror, with so much breadth and intensity of effect, that it made Hester Prynne feel as if it could not be the image of her own child, but of an imp who was seeking to mold itself into Pearl's shape.

The portraits are obviously intended as an apology for the static portraits in the book, as an illustration of

the principle of simplification by distance and by generalization; the new armor, on the other hand, is the new faith which brought the Puritans to New England, and which not only shone with piety – "especially the helmet and breastplate", the covering of the head and heart – but supported them in their practical struggles with physical adversaries, and which in addition altered their view of the life about them to dogmatic essentials, so that Hester was obliterated behind the fact of her sin, and Pearl transformed in view of her origin. Governor Bellingham, in his combination of legal training with military prowess, is representative of his fellow colonists, who displayed in a remarkable degree a capacity to act with great strength and with absolutely simple directness upon principles so generalized as scarcely to be applicable to any specific moral problem, which mastered moral difficulties not by understanding them, but by crushing them out.

Historically and relatively considered, Richard Bellingham might conceivably have been spared this function in the story, for of his group he was one of the two or three most humane and liberal; but the qualities represented were the qualities of the group of which he was a leader, and were extremely evident in most of the actions of the colony. Perhaps the best – or in another sense, the worst – embodiment of these qualities is to be found in John Endecott, of whom Professor Andrews gives the following picture:

> Endecott had few lovable qualities. He was stern, unyielding, and on some subjects a zealot. Johnson, apostrophizes him as "strong, valiant John", whom Christ had called to be his soldier, but the Old Planters, most if not all of whom were Anglicans and demanded service ac-

cording to the Book of Common Prayer, deemed themselves slaves and took in very bad part his determination to suppress the Church of England in the colony. They preferred Roger Conant, who though a less forcible man, was one much easier to get along with. Endecott's later career discloses his attitude toward those who differed with him – the heathen Indian, the Quaker, the prisoner before him for judgement, and the Brownes and other upholders of the Anglican service who were disaffected with the Puritan government. It also shows his dislike of forms and devices that offended him – the Book of Common Prayer, the cross of St. George, and the Maypole. He was hard, intolerant, and at times cruel. Even the Massachusetts government caused him "to be sadly admonished for his offense" in mutilating the flag at Salem in 1635, charging him with "rashness, uncharitableness, indiscretion, and exceeding the limits of his calling"; and again in the same year "committed" him for losing his temper. Endecott once apologized to Winthrop for striking "goodman Dexter", acknowledging that he was rash, but saying that Dexter's conduct "would have provoked a very patient man". It is odd that Endecott should have chosen for his seal a skull and cross-bones.

It is interesting to observe in such a passage, as in many others, that the Puritans cannot be discussed, nor can they discuss each other, without the language employed exceeding the limits proper to predestinarians and invoking the traditional morality of the older churches; yet the attempt to ignore this traditional morality as far as might be, and, in the matter of formal doctrine, to repudiate it, unquestionably had much to do with the formation of such characters as Professor Andrews here describes and as Hawthorne in the last passage quoted from him symbolizes. The imperceptive, unwavering brutality of many of the

actions committed in the name of piety in the Massachusetts colonies more than justified the curse and prophecy uttered by Matthew Maule, that God would give these Puritans blood to drink; in the name of God, they had violently cut themselves off from human nature; in the end, that is in Hawthorne's generation and in the generation following, more than one of them drank his own heart's blood, as Hawthorne himself must have done in his ultimate and frustrated solitude; and more than one of them shed it.

It is noteworthy that in this passage from *The Scarlet Letter* Hawthorne turns his instrument of allegory, the gift of the Puritans, against the Puritans themselves, in order to indicate the limits of their intelligence; it is noteworthy also that this act of criticism, though both clear and sound, is negative, that he nowhere except in the very general notion of regeneration through repentance establishes the nature of the intelligence which might exceed the intelligence of the Puritans, but rather hints at the ideal existence of a richer and more detailed understanding than the Puritan scheme of life is able to contain. The strength of *The Scarlet Letter* is in part safeguarded by the refusal to explore this understanding; the man who was able in the same lifetime to write *The New Adam and Eve*, to conceive the art colony described in *The Marble Faun*, and to be shocked at the nude statues of antiquity, was scarcely the man to cast a clear and steady light upon the finer details of the soul.

The conception of the book in general is as cleanly allegorical as is the conception of the passage quoted. Hester represents the repentant sinner, Dimmesdale the half-repentant sinner, and Chillingworth the unre-

pentant sinner. The fact that Chillingworth's sin is the passion for revenge is significant only to the extent that this is perhaps the one passion which most completely isolates man from normal human sympathies and which therefore is most properly used to represent an unregenerate condition.

The method of allegorization is that of the Puritans themselves; the substance of the allegory remained in a crude form a part of their practical Christianity in spite of their Calvinism, just as it remained in their non-theological linguistic forms, just as we can see it in the language of the best poems of so purely and mystically Calvinistic a writer as Jones Very, a living language related to a living experience, but overflowing the limits of Calvinistic dogma. Hawthorne's point of view was naturally more enlightened than that of the Puritans themselves, yet it was insufficiently so to enable him to recover the traditional Christian ethics except in the most general terms and by way of historical sympathy, for had a more complete recovery been possible, he would not have been so narrowly bound to allegory and the frustration of the later romances would not have been so complete.

Once Hawthorne had reduced the problem of sin to terms as general as these, and had brought his allegory to perfect literary form, he had, properly speaking, dealt with sin once and for all; there was nothing further to be said about it. It would not serve to write another allegory with a new set of characters and a different sin as the motive; for the particular sin is not particular in function, but is merely representative of sin in general, as the characters, whatever their names and conditions may be, are merely representative of

the major stages of sin – there is no escape from the generality so long as one adheres to the method. There was nothing further to be done in this direction, save a few footnotes to the subject in the form of sketches.

The only alternative remaining was to move away from the allegorical extreme of narrative toward the specific, that is, toward the art of the novelist. The attempt was made, but fell short of success. In *The House of the Seven Gables* and in *The Marble Faun* alike the moral understanding of the action – and there is a serious attempt at such understanding, at least in *The Marble Faun* – is corrupted by a provincial sentimentalism ethically far inferior to the Manicheism of the Puritans, which was plain and comprehensive, however brutal. And Hawthorne had small gift for the creation of human beings, a defect closely allied to his other defects and virtues: even the figures in *The Scarlet Letter* are profoundly unsatisfactory if one comes to the book expecting to find a novel, for they draw their life not from specific and familiar human characteristics, as do the figures of Henry James, but from the precision and intensity with which they render their respective ideas; the very development of the story is neither narrative nor dramatic, but expository. When, as in *The Marble Faun* or *The House of the Seven Gables*, there is no idea governing the human figure, or when the idea is an incomplete equivalent of the figure, the figure is likely to be a disappointing spectacle, for he is seldom if ever a convincing human being and is likely to verge on the ludicrous. Hawthorne had not the rich awareness of immediacy which might have saved a writer such as Melville in a similar predicament.

His effort to master the novelist's procedure, however, was not sustained, for his heart was not in it. In *The Blithedale Romance*, he began as a novelist, but lost himself toward the close in an unsuccessful effort to achieve allegory; the four unfinished romances represent similar efforts throughout. His procedure in the last works was startlingly simple; so much so, that no one whom I can recollect has run the risk of defining it. In *The Scarlet Letter* there occurs a formula which one might name the formula of alternative possibilities. In the ninth chapter, for example, there occurs the following passage:

> The people, in the case of which we speak, could justify its prejudice against Roger Chillingworth by no fact or argument worthy of serious refutation. There was an aged handicraftsman, it is true, who had been a citizen of London at the period of Sir Thomas Overbury's murder, now some thirty years agone; he testified to having seen the physician, under some other name, which the narrator of the story had now forgotten, in company with Dr. Forman, the famous old conjuror, who was implicated in the affair of Overbury. Two or three individuals hinted, that the man of skill, during his Indian captivity, had enlarged his medical attainments by joining in the incantations of the savage priests; who were universally acknowledged to be powerful enchanters, often performing seemingly miraculous cures by their skill in the black art. A large number – many of them were persons of such sober sense and practical observation that their opinions would have been valuable in other matters – affirmed that Roger Chillingworth's aspect had undergone a remarkable change while he had dwelt in the town, and especially since his abode with Dimmesdale. At first, his expression had been calm, meditative,

scholar-like. Now, there was something ugly and evil in his face, which they had not previously noticed, and which grew still more obvious to sight the oftener they looked upon him. According to the vulgar idea, the fire in his laboratory had been brought from the lower regions, and was fed with infernal fuel; and so, as might be expected, his visage was getting sooty with smoke.

In such a passage as this, the idea conveyed is clear enough, but the embodiment of the idea appears far-fetched, and Hawthorne offers it whimsically and apologetically, professing to let you take it or leave it. Another example occurs in the eighteenth chapter; Dimmesdale and Hester are sitting in the forest, planning the flight which ultimately is never to take place, and Pearl, the symbolic offspring of the untamed elements of human nature, and hence akin to the forest, which, in the Puritan mind, was ruled by Satan in person, plays apart:

> A fox, startled from his sleep by her light footstep on the leaves, looked inquisitively at Pearl, as doubting whether it were better to steal off or renew his nap on the same spot. A wolf, it is said — but here the tale has surely lapsed into the improbable — came up and smelt of Pearl's robe, and offered his savage head to be patted by her hand. The truth seems to be, however, that the mother-forest, and these wild things which it nourished, all recognized a kindred wildness in the human child.

Similarly, in *The Marble Faun*, one never learns whether Donatello had or had not the pointed ears which serve throughout the book as the physical symbol of his moral nature; the book ends with the question being put to Kenyon, who has had opportunities to observe, and with his refusing to reply.

The device, though it becomes a minor cause of irritation through constant recurrence, is relatively harmless, and at times is even used with good effect. If we reverse the formula, however, so as to make the physical representation perfectly clear but the meaning uncertain, we have a very serious situation; and this is precisely what occurs, in some measure toward the close of *The Blithedale Romance*, and without mitigation throughout the four unfinished romances. We have in the last all of the machinery and all of the mannerisms of the allegorist, but we cannot discover the substance of his communication, nor is he himself aware of it so far as we can judge. We have the symbolic footprint, the symbolic spider, the symbolic elixirs and poisons, but we have not that of which they are symbolic; we have the hushed, the tense and confidential manner, on the part of the narrator, of one who imparts a grave secret, but the words are inaudible. Yet we have not, on the other hand, anything approaching realistic fiction, for the events are improbable or even impossible, and the characters lack all reality. The technique neither of the novelist nor the allegorist was available to Hawthorne when he approached the conditions of his own experience: he had looked for signals in nature so long and so intently, as his ancestors before him had done, that, like a man hypnotized, or corroded with madness, he saw them; but he no longer had any way of determining their significance, and he had small talent for rendering their physical presence with intensity.

Percy Boynton, quoting in *Literature and American Life* the following passage from *Septimius Felton*, refers to it as a self-portrait:

As for Septimius, let him alone a moment or two, and then they would see him, with his head bent down, brooding, his eyes fixed on some chip, some stone, some common plant, any commonest thing, as if it were the clew and index to some mystery; and when, by chance startled out of these meditations, he lifted his eyes, there would be a kind of perplexity, a dissatisfied, foiled look in them, as if of his speculations he found no end.

It is in this generation and the next that we see most clearly and bitterly the realization of Maule's prophecy. These men were cut off from their heritage, from their source of significance, and were abnormally sensitive to the influence of European Romanticism. In Emerson the terms of New England mysticism and of Romantic amoralism were fused and confused so inextricably that we have not yet worked ourselves free of them. In Poe, a man born without a background, New England or any other, Romantic doctrine was introduced directly, in a form free of theological terminology, but in a form none the less which would tend in the long run to support the influence of Emerson. In Melville, the greatest of his era and of his nation, we find a writer superior at certain points in his career – in books such as *Moby Dick* and *Benito Cereno*, for example – to the confusion and apparently understanding it; at other points – in books like *Mardi* and *Pierre* – succumbing to the confusion; at all points in his career made to suffer for the confusion of contemporary literary taste; and at the end, settling himself in silence, a figure more difficult to face than the Hawthorne, because more conscious, more controlled, and more nearly indifferent.

In Henry Adams we see the curse at work most

clearly: intellectual but inconsecutive, unable to justify any principle of action, yet with a character of the highest; a character which demanded not only just action but its justification, he was damned to a kind of restless torment, in which, though an historian of great learning and of high academic distinction, he transformed the Middle Ages by a process of subtle falsification, into a symbol of his own latter-day New England longing; in which, though a stylist of great power and precision, he propounded the aesthetic theory that modern art must be confused to express confusion; in which, though a philosopher of sorts, he created one of the most unphilosophical theories of history imaginable, as a poetic symbol of his own despair. In the suicide of Henry Adams' wife it is inconceivable that we see the logical outcome of his own dilemma, an outcome in his own case prevented by the inheritance of character, which, like his confusion, was bequeathed him by early New England.

In *The Scarlet Letter*, then, Hawthorne composed a great allegory; or, if we look first at the allegorical view of life upon which early Puritan society was based, we might almost say that he composed a great historical novel. History, which by placing him in an anti-intellectual age had cut him off from the ideas which might have enabled him to deal with his own period, in part made up for the injustice by facilitating his entrance, for a brief time, into an age more congenial to his nature. Had he possessed the capacity for criticizing and organizing conceptions as well as for dramatizing them, he might have risen superior to his disadvantages, but like many other men of major genius he lacked this capacity. In turning his back

upon the excessively simplified conceptions of his Puritan ancestors, he abandoned the only orderly concepts, whatever their limitations, to which he had access, and in his last work he is restless and dissatisfied. The four last romances are unfinished, and in each successive one he sought to incorporate and perfect elements from those preceding; the last, *The Dolliver Romance*, which he had sought to make the best, had he lived, is a mere fragment, but on the face of it is the most preposterous of all.

His dilemma, the choice between abstractions inadequate or irrelevant to experience on the one hand, and experience on the other as far as practicable unilluminated by understanding, is tragically characteristic of the history of this country and of its literature; only a few scattered individuals, at the cost of inordinate labor, and often impermanently, have achieved the permeation of human experience by a consistent moral understanding which results in wisdom and in great art. If art is to be measured by the greatness of the difficulties overcome — and the measure is not wholly unreasonable, for there can scarcely be virtue without a comprehension of sin, and the wider and more careful the comprehension the richer the virtue — then these few writers are very great indeed. Hawthorne, when he reversed his formula of alternative possibilities, and sought to grope his way blindly to significance, made the choice of the later Romantics; and his groping was met wherever he moved by the smooth and impassive surface of the intense inane.

# Mr. Belloc, Mr. Penty, and Machinery

W. P. Witcutt

Mr. belloc, in the April number of The American Review, objects to Mr. Penty's statement that we can hardly restore economic freedom and re-establish private property unless we get rid of or modify the present wide use of machinery. This point of view is, he says, heretical. And he compresses the reason why he considers it heretical into a double formula, the positive side of which is that the mind directs human affairs, and the negative side that the dead thing does not determine life.

To descend from the realm of abstractions, the difference between Mr. Belloc and Mr. Penty appears to be a question of priority.

*Belloc* says restore economic freedom and private property, and the question of machinery can be left to look after itself.

*Penty* says, as a corollary of the restoration of property, pass laws restricting the use of machinery.

Mr. Penty laid down a whole series of rules for the restriction of machinery, all of which may be summed up in the one fact that he did not mind the small machine which can be used by the small owner of property, nor the restricted use of large machines, where necessary. It is a mistake to think that Penty advocated the complete abolition of machinery. He did not, any more than Ruskin or Morris did. "This problem," he wrote in *Old Worlds for New*, "so far as production

is concerned, resolves itself finally into a question of size. We can isolate a small machine because we can turn it off or on at will. Such a machine can be used to reduce the amount of drudgery that requires to be done, and enable us to pursue more interesting work."

And, in perhaps what was his last pronouncement on the subject, in a letter to the present writer a few months before his death, Mr. Penty wrote: "It is a question of proportion – to a limited amount of machinery one would not object. . . . There are machines which men use – I do not object to them. But there are others which use men and to these I object. In the last letter of the correspondence he wrote: "Considered in the abstract machinery is not evil – the evil is in the way we use it."

As regards the position which they think machinery should occupy in the world, Mr. Belloc and Mr. Penty do not seem to disagree one whit.

"Machinery does us harm if we use it harmfully," wrote the former in the above-mentioned article. "When a man says, 'Machine-made products are always monotonous', then the answer is, 'Use them only to make products which can be monotonous without doing harm.' " Compare this with Mr. Penty's statement in *Means and Ends*: "The use of machinery should be restricted where its use conflicts with the claims of personality – that is, it should not be allowed to turn men into robots."

In my opinion, the difference between Mr. Belloc and Mr. Penty is purely a question of policy. Mr. Penty wants immediate action by law; Mr. Belloc wants delayed action by public opinion. But they both aim at the same end.

Talk of the restriction of the use of machinery to an average member of the middle class (who has in all probability never seen a productive as apart from a transport machine), and he will call you a crank. Talk of the restriction of machinery to an average member of the working class, and he will heartily applaud you. (Only the other day I was amused at a meeting by the hostile attitude towards machinery manifested by a number of Birmingham factory hands.) But it is the middle class which is in control of public opinion and its organs, and therefore Mr. Belloc's policy seems best. But I cannot see that Mr. Penty's view is heretical. If we pass laws restricting the use of machinery, surely that is a fine example of the mind directing human affairs.

# The End of Democracy

## *Ralph Adams Cram's Plea for a New Order*

Geoffrey Stone

Numerous observers have of late predicted the end of our social order and, even, of our civilization. Some of them have been moved to their prediction by long thought, more by the chaos of events since 1929. Among the former is Ralph Adams Cram, who, though his chief reputation is as an architect, is a social critic of profound insight. In some five or six books, the first of which appeared in 1918 (part of it was written as early as 1908), he has forecast the inevitable decline of our order, seeing this decline as a result of an immutable law of history, as well as the contradictions inherent in the structures of the age. History, in Mr. Cram's estimate, runs in cycles of approximately five hundred years, within which time a particular type of society has its birth, its flowering, and its decay; and we are now at the end of the cycle which began *circa* 1400. Since Mr. Cram is an orthodox Christian, with a firm belief in free will, his theory does not share the romantic determinism of Spengler's, though he is of a like mind with the German at a number of points: if man has not much chance of making a culture endure more than half a millennium, it is still his choice as to what form that culture shall take, and his happiness, or lack of it, during the entire cycle depends on the wisdom of his choice. Like Arthur J. Penty, another architect and social critic whose gifts enabled him to carry his analysis beyond

the mere epiphenomena of the times, Mr. Cram looks to the Middle Ages as the period most nearly perfect in form, and therefore a fit model for the age which will succeed the present one. Man being man, and none of his works perfect, the Middle Ages offer a lesson in what to avoid as well as what to emulate; of this Mr. Cram is aware, but, since he does not subscribe to the doctrine of Progress ("there has been no *qualitative* advance in human cultures", he holds, since the days of the Old Kingdom in Egypt), he does not conclude that the main item in our legacy of knowledge is the mistakes of the past.

The thesis of Mr. Cram's latest book* is contained in its title: we are witnessing "the end of democracy". It is not a spectacle that Mr. Cram looks on with dismay; he does not equate our democratic forms of government with civilization and take their decay to mean the incidence of barbarism. "It is rather a sign," he says, "of that new dynamic that comes as well from ill conditions as from good and is in effect a promise of a new energy that is born of the hard realization of facts, of a visualizing of new standards of value, and is, even unconsciously, destined to build up the new era that gives promise of better things than were encompassed in the old." One of the better things the coming age may accomplish is High Democracy, which phrase Mr. Cram uses in contrast to the Low Democracy that has prevailed in the West during the last one hundred and fifty years. ". . . Our social, economic, and political estate is now, and has been for seventy years, the antithesis of a true democratic polity and state. Not

* THE END OF DEMOCRACY *by Ralph Adams Cram* (MARSHALL JONES. 261 pp. $3.00).

only does it negative all the principles of the Higher Democracy, it has lost even the reality of its modern degenerate form."

Democracy is not the abolition of status, the elimination of grades or rank in the social organism, the establishing of one dead level of uniformity by pulling down from above and pushing up from below. Aristocracy and monarchy are not inconsistent with its ethos — but they must be of the right type. The contemporary aristocracy built on material power and the monarchies that followed the end of the Middle Ages and held pretty well down to the time of the Great War are inconsistent with high democratic principle.

The reasons for the failure of the current type of democracy extend to many planes: ethical, economic, political. The ethical revolution which took place with the Renaissance, releasing the economic and political fields from moral control and man from authoritative standards of conduct, brought into positions of power at the center of society a type of man who, however frequent he had been in the past, at least had existed in conflict with society and had not been secured in it by a widely accepted philosophy. "What was wanted was a type ambitious, daring, and courageous, but self-seeking, ruthless, and cold-blooded; shrewd, crafty, and unscrupulous, covetous of wealth, and greedy for power; unconscious of any religious sanctions except those of Calvinistic determinism, predestination, and salvation by faith; constrained by no moral conditions save those of the jungle." Such came to hand, says Mr. Cram, in the "iron-masters, the mill owners, the usurers and profiteers", who found in the developments of the industrial revolution an ideal

means for securing and extending the positions of power and wealth they had gained with the Reformation. These men were, on the whole, "base-born upstarts" – which means that their thought and actions were dominated by the urge to power of the underdog, that their motives were anti-social, and that they sought, in respect to what was good in the past, to destroy.

What they sought most anxiously to destroy was the institution of widely distributed private property, and the restraints established by custom and law that secured it; for the small unit of property, independently held, stood in the way of accumulating huge fortunes. The economics of small property were incompatible with those of industrial and finance-capitalism; and, because in any society wealth means political power, small property militated against the political monopoly which was a corollary of industrial monopoly. The destruction of the high Mediaeval form of property resulted in "hordes of barbarized proletarians who could easily be regimented and again bound in slavery, no longer fixed in serfage to the land but in equal serfage to the machine". Thus there were, and are, the two poles of society: the irresponsible boss and his irresponsible slave. As things now stand, almost the only conflict between them is economic; their values and their frames of mind are identical; both are essentially materialistic, with the *Weltanschauung* and the whole set of responses that involves.

Thus, in a certain sense, the modern world is really ruled by the proletariat (Mr. Belloc has pointed out that the tone of our times is set by the proletariat, so that our system could more justly be called proleta-

rianism than capitalism). The monied men may decide matters of policy, but their decisions are always tempered to the tradition-shorn proletarian mind; it is a necessity imposed by the political structure and by the fact that proletarian habit of mind marks master as much as servant. The vast ballyhoo of press, advertising, and radio is only partly cynical; its perpetrators indeed lie consciously for their own profit, but that profit is something made possible because the deceived view it as an ultimate value just as do the deceivers. Mass man, says Mr. Cram, taking the phrase from Señor Ortega, sets the tone of our society, and, since man is merged into the mass only at the lowest common denominator in his character, society is actually organized for the cultivation of the trivial, the base, and the inhuman.

It is in such a society that the democratic politician flourishes. Political activity is always the work of a restricted group, and in the great modern democracies this group is more effectively cut off from the people than it would be even in an avowed aristocracy. In England, which is openly ruled by an oligarchy, the government, though now losing its aristocratic qualities, is still by popular consent vested in the hands of a restricted group that by training and inheritance (during the last fifty years, to be sure, this class has been increasingly recruited from upstart plutocrats and Jews who have purchased titles) is assumed to have a special aptitude for government; and this, being an affair of status, makes for responsibility, however much it is corrupted by wealth. In the United States, politicians hold office on the fiction of popular choice, they are irresponsible because they can always escape

the responsibility for their errors, *i.e.*, their malfeasance, by passing the buck to the people.

Chicanery and wealth being the two passports to a political career, the politician is recruited from either the wealthy or the proletariat: his course is to pander to the greed of the first while playing upon the ignorance and corruption of the second. The parties into which politicians are banded correspond to no real national issues; squabbling sets of ins and outs, they are agreed on the basic principles of milking the public to the extreme and perpetuating themselves in power. They represent the people only in so far as they reflect the degradation of the mass man, and their scrambles for personal gain indicate the base standards of a materialist society. The record of the democratic politician, says Mr. Cram,

> is one of individual self-interest, partisan chicanery, diplomatic duplicity. In almost every case the great issues that arose through the upheavals known as Renaissance, Reformation, and Revolution were bungled and mishandled. There was no regard for or reference to the great moral principles that are supposed to underlie human life, or even to those of basic justice and the common good. It is very likely that no more than half the sorry count can be attributed to malice, double dealing, or lack of moral sense; the rest came out of sheer stupidity on the part of the actors and the fact that they were not of the sort that was by nature capable of handling problems of such moment.

The way to correct this state of affairs, Mr. Cram contends, is to re-examine the intentions of the founders of the Constitution, then to take such measures as will bring these intentions nearer to realization. The

framers of the Constitution, he insists, feared nothing more than they feared the type of democracy we now have, and their whole purpose was to found an aristocratic republic, secure a limited franchise, and erect a system that would neither suffer from popular whim nor fall prey to unscrupulous wealth. They envisaged a government in certain of its aspects resembling that of England (as it then was) – with the vital difference that this government was not to extend over a majority of propertyless citizens, but over a citizenry that was in main small landholders. Looking on the society of their day as having a permament character, they attempted to arrange things so that the duties of government would fall into the hands of men of more-than-average property, who stood in an organic and enduring relation to the community (unlike the modern capitalist, whose position is mechanical and may change overnight), and thus had a personal interest in its continued welfare. What they did not foresee was the growth of a new political temper and the rise of capitalist monopoly. They did not foresee that their postulate that all men are created equal would be taken not only to mean that they are equal before courts of law (and today they are not even that owing to the constitutionally abetted growth of the corporation), but also that they are equal before statutory law; that this would lead to universal suffrage and direct election; that in the end the doctrine would prevail that the majority of the moment is right. Nor did they foresee that this absolute political freedom would be divorced from economic freedom, with the consequent debasement of popular judgement.

"When universal suffrage came in," says Mr. Cram,

"democracy went out as a practicable proposition." To reinstate it as a practicable proposition, as the founding Fathers conceived it, "the first necessity is to get rid of the Reconstruction dogma that this [the electoral franchise] is a natural right appertaining to all men (and women) by virtue of their humanity". Although, Mr. Cram says, the vote "should be considered a solemn duty and a high privilege", this is at present " 'politically inexpedient' ".

There are two things, however, that might, perhaps, be done, which would help not only in action, but in establishing a right judgement as to the nature of the franchise itself. These are: first, the withdrawing of the voting privilege from those convicted of any crime or misdemeanor involving "moral turpitude"; second, the ownership of property, real or functional, as a prerequisite to the exercise of the electoral franchise. . . . "Property" is . . . the ownership in fee simple of land, tools of trade, or an individually owned business or individually practised profession, sufficient to guarantee decent living conditions for an household. A wage or salary is not property and the recipient of such is, strictly speaking, a proletarian. A proletarian is not a free man and only free men can safely participate in government.

These voters, Mr. Cram suggests, might be organized in "hundreds"; that is, each hundred voters voting for an elector, who in turn would cast his vote for higher officials, "and so on upward until a final group would choose the members of the lower house of the national legislature".

The national legislature itself would have to undergo drastic revision to return it to what it was originally intended to be – and what it must again be if

our problems are to be solved. Its members might be chosen according to functional representation such as now obtains in Italy. Along with this would go the reorganization of the country along regional, rather than State, lines with reference to the economic and geographical character of the sections. And the Senate would be so transformed as to be actually occupied by elder statesmen, perhaps elected for life and free of partisan affiliations. A necessary concomitant of these changes would be a great strengthening of the executive office, until, in fact, the government was monarchical in principle. Amongst modern democratic rulers, the President of the United States comes closest to being a monarch in the true sense; he exercises far more power than does the King of England, who is little more than an elaborate trademark, and he represents the nation, or is supposed to, in a manner impossible for the various European prime ministers, who are, almost by definition, party leaders. The present vigor of governmental activity in America, the fact that real issues are now being debated, though perhaps in the wrong terms, the sincere, if often misguided, concern of the government with the welfare of the mass of the citizens, are all signs of the monarchical principle at work; for surely no one will ascribe these things to the persons at present in Congress rather than to Mr. Roosevelt. At the same time, it is evident that Mr. Roosevelt of necessity as well as by choice trims his sails to what issues from the political windbags; and there is no guarantee that his administration will not degenerate into ward politics on a national scale or that his successor will not be of the same dimensions as some of the incompetents who have held

office in the past. The first move, in Mr. Cram's estimation, would be to raise the President above partisan concerns by giving him office for life and by choosing him in some manner that would make him "the august and honored personification of the state".

Under normal circumstances a President chosen as suchlike are chosen today cannot play this part. The candidate who is seen maneouvering for nomination, working to secure pledges and delegates, giving promises and negotiating deals with other politicians, rushing over the country in "whirlwind campaigns", broadcasting eloquent addresses to every known type of citizen, hedging diplomatically here, "viewing with alarm" there: "the little friend of all the world" (of his own party) until the votes are counted – such an one may give an entertaining show, arouse the facile admiration of the "go-getter" for his similar qualities, but he can never personify the state. Elected, he can hardly slough off the ignominious connotations of the political campaign. He is always the head of his party, not the head of the people in their inner consciousness.

The whole of this program, Mr. Cram is well aware, calls for an immense limitation of liberty – at least political liberty, as it is now conceived. But our present liberty – if we allow the correctness of Mr. Cram's analysis – is no true liberty at all, for liberty is that condition which allows man to function at the highest level of his faculties, and the standards and organization of the present age are, as it were, a gigantic conspiracy against this. It is a truism which cannot be repeated too often that man achieves his best by observing his limitations; it is proved by the modern world that when he attempts to cast these off and

enjoy a freedom which is really license, he makes for himself new limitations which, forged in ignorance and secrecy, warp his nature. The problem of freedom, then, at last hinges upon the moral quality of the individual, and freedom in any given society depends upon the moral tone of that society as established by the individuals who compose it.

Since, in the modern society, information, as dispensed by the press and other agencies, is of such importance to the moral tone of the community, restriction of the freedom of the press would seem necessary. Viewing the "degenerative influence" of our great newspapers, Mr. Cram agrees that censorship of some kind is indicated, but he makes no specific suggestions as to how it shall operate; ultimately, he says, censorship depends on the quality of the men who use it. "One man or one government might safely be entrusted with power of determination as to the scope of these salving restrictions, while another man or government might be of a temper that would use this power towards the accomplishment of slavery or even of social destruction." It is on that note of the regeneration of the individual as the thing of primary importance, and the form of government as of secondary importance, that Mr. Cram closes his book: "A stream cannot rise above its source, and the source of the river of human life is the individual man."

*The End of Democracy*, as I have tried to show in the foregoing résumé, is an extremely able and provocative book: its analysis cuts across our weightiest problems by considering the essential factors in any society at any stage – leadership, aristocracy, the form of property or its absence, the condition of freedom.

Since critics of the Marxian persuasion have the popular ear, Mr. Cram's approach will seem to many too much concerned with intangibles, too little with the economic question. But economics, in which the disequilibrium of our society is so painfully evident, is a symptom – and an aggravation – of the disease, rather than its cause; and the emphasis of the Marxists upon it is a result of the purblindness forced on them by their materialistic view. The order of change in society, as Mr. Belloc says, is always first in philosophy, then in politics, and finally in economics; and a change in philosophy, or in the human spirit, is what Mr. Cram has called for as the basis of true reform. True reform is of its nature organic, for society is organic – as will be plain once we recognize the error of the Liberal theory of the state as a collection of not too violently opposed individuals. Change in an organism does not so much proceed from part to part as take place in a new disposition in the relation of the parts; that is, all the parts undergo some modification in their connections with each other, and the sum total is a new form, or way of functioning, in the organism. This is evident, for instance, in Fascism, to which Mr. Cram is opposed. Fascism seems to many not to have departed from capitalism in essentials, because it retains the wage system, private property, and the like, but in fact it is a most profound change, because the spirit and direction of the state have been changed. Instead of accepting a condition of class war as normal, like capitalism, or tending toward the catastrophic, but theoretically easy, solution of abolishing class, like Communism, Fascism rejects the materialistic conception which underlies either of these; in General Fuller's distinction, Fascism

chooses the spiritual man as against the economic man. That this is accompanied by a good measure of crudity and nationalist excess does not alter the nature of the change, for emotional revivals are not noted for decorum; they present other qualities for our admiration.

It is this organic nature of change that Mr. Cram – who, to be sure, does not hold any mechanical or materialistic theory of the state – would seem to overlook in the main point of his practical scheme, the limitation of the franchise. Industrial capitalism and mass democracy developed, in the first place, out of a limited franchise; it is hard to see that their development will be reversed by going back to the electoral form of an earlier period. Mr. Cram, it is true, would make the spirit in which the vote is used a different one by restricting it to small property-owners, thus limiting the expression of both the capitalist and the proletarian temper. But a limitation according to property scarcely seems a plausible one at the present time, for property, in Mr. Cram's sense, is far from a reality today, and where the small productive unit does exist, in the hands of what he calls "the forgotten class", it will be found to be, in one way or another, at the mercy of the huge combine. The restriction of the franchise is a political change, and it is putting things in the wrong order to expect that responsible leadership will follow from it. Indeed, the problem of true popular leadership precedes it in time and in importance; apart from a leader, the focal point and the symbol of the spirit of change, the enthusiasm for a new order, and the will toward it, do not appear possible in the heterogeneous modern world. Besides this, some sort of authoritarian rule would seem to be needed to restore property: to see

that the sentiment in favor of small property shall have effective expression and not be sidetracked and corrupted, as were the Populist and similar movements in our past. This again brings to mind the horrid word Fascism; but it would be wise to recall that Communism as the successor to capitalism has so far been successfully eliminated by but one thing – Fascism; and only Fascism has set up monarchical rule that is *above* the contending factions of the state and governs in the interests of all. Fascism is, without doubt, far from perfection, but at present it represents the nearest approach, perhaps the only practicable one, to the ideal of kingship Mr. Cram advances.

Mr. Cram's proposals for an aristocracy contain similar difficulties. He would recruit it, by election, from the professional and small-propertied men, maintaining that in a properly organized society the "natural aristocrat" will ascend to positions of trust and power. This resembles the schemes of such thinkers as Ortega and Madariaga; it is in effect a sort of modified liberalism. Aristocracies in the past, though they have originated from below, have been confirmed from above; they have been, in other words, hierarchical. Aristocracy may be recruited from the populace, as are the clergy in the Catholic Church, and its position in a healthy society always reposes on popular acceptance, but the choice of the aristocrat is only in a most indirect fashion democratic. Aristocracies determine their membership and their organization from within; if they are subject to nothing higher than themselves they tend to ossify and become tyrannical, or they loosen and become plutocratic; their ideal position is in the service of a monarch who represents the common people.

Here again the nearest approach to a genuine aristocracy (an aristocracy, that is to say, which does not rule in its own interest, as does the English governing class, but carries out the functions of government under the direction of a supreme single ruler) is found in the Fascist parties. In them the governing groups are largely recruited from the rank and file, they are welded together by a common standard of conduct, and submit to a discipline originating at the top.

These few criticisms of Mr. Cram's book will serve to indicate the stimulating nature of his thesis, which cuts so deeply and to so many central issues of the day that an adequate consideration of all his points would require an equally lengthy statement. *The End of Democracy* is another evidence from Mr. Cram that he is one of that small body of men who are trying to think out our problems in the light of what history has shown man to be. The need of such thought is urgent; what we may expect from misdirected action following on failure to grasp the true circumstances is but one thing: progress more and more to the Left, where – in the true style of madness – a lack of a sense of reality is accompanied by boundless energy. What this means has been made abundantly clear by the fate of Spain. Those who wish the best of the past to endure into the future must not delay in reconciling their fundamental principles with the world as it presents itself now, which is the only way the basis for effective action can be laid. The task, both in its theoretical aspect and in its practical, will not be easy; but by its accomplishment the end of democracy, as we have known it, can be made the beginning of something better.

# The Materialistic and the Humanistic Interpretations of History

Folke Leander

The materialistic interpretation of history is of course historically associated above all with the name of Karl Marx. But I am not going to discuss orthodox Marxism here, for I know of no first-rate contemporary thinker, however sympathetic he may be towards the materialistic interpretation of history, who has not given up the unduly narrow Marxian view of it. The materialistic interpretation of history lives on, no doubt, but in subtler and intellectually more defensible forms.

The rival view of history I have here termed the humanistic interpretation. According to this view, there is more than one basic factor at work in history and in society. There are not only the so-called material needs of men, and the clash of motives so determined, the constant and insatiable outreaching of individuals and classes and nations for material goods, for power and enjoyment. There are not only the ideologies inspired by these basic desires of men, the idealistic overgrowths serving as instruments and rationalizing justifications of the material desires of warring groups of men. There is also another factor at work in history, in society, and in man which cannot be accounted for on materialistic postulates: namely, a will to justice, to human dignity, and to a fullness of

life transcending the satisfactions of material desires. And this higher factor, it is held, though it may be easily overlooked in the welter of clashing ambitions that to many would seem to make up the whole of history, is nevertheless the factor that has made civilization possible; it is the formative principle binding men together into civilized societies, the purely ideal force (*pace* all Deweyites) creating order out of the chaos of animal desires and enabling men to come together on the level of civilized human life. Historically, this is the force that has created civilization, and that has been at work throughout its history precariously keeping it together; and the slackening or disappearance of it would result in the inevitable collapse of civilization and its submergence in barbarism.

The materialistic philosophy of history recognizes no such ideal factor at work in history, in society, or in man. What we see from the dawn of history down to our own times, it is alleged, is but one thing: a series of births and deaths, and between them the struggle for existence, for power and enjoyment: classes and groups in society working their way towards a more favorable economic position, nations struggling for hegemony and power – in Hobbes's famous words, "a desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death". And through this long cavalcade of successive generations civilization has gradually come into existence as a result of the endless clashes, compromises, victories, and defeats of individuals and groups in their constant struggle against one another and against the rest of nature.

What is all our science if not a way of controlling the forces of nature? What are our codes of morals

if not rules of action which enable us to live in societies and which society violently forces upon us as individuals? What is religion if not the metaphysical sanction of such codes of morals, promising eternal rewards for actions compatible with, and eternal punishment for actions harmful to, the interests of society? Or it may be that religion is the "opium of the people", as Marx phrased it; it may be the doctrine enforced by the upper classes of society upon its lower classes in order to make them content with their lot and thus keep them in constant subjection. It may, in other words, be the class ideology of the bourgeoisie suppressing the proletariat, or of mediaeval robber barons allying themselves to the Church in order to secure their unscrupulous conquests. It may, on the other hand, be the ideology of the slaves, of the poor and heavy-laden of the decadent Roman Empire claiming equality, if not economic then at least spiritual, with the rich and prosperous.

It is not hard to see the will to power behind the religious ideology of a James I declaring:

> Kings are justly called gods; for they exercise a manner of resemblance of Divine power upon earth. For if you will consider the attributes of God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a king. God hath power to create or destroy, make or unmake at His pleasure, to give life or send death, to judge all and to be accountable to none. And the like power have kings. They make or unmake their subjects; they have power of raising up or casting down; of life and death; judges over all their subjects and in all cases, yet accountable to none but God. They have power to exalt low things and abase high things and to make of their subjects like men at chess.

Does not the will to power gleam through these words, badly veiled by the religious ideology in which it seeks support, glaring at us with the blood-red eyes of ruthless egoism? "The state of monarchy is the supremest thing on earth," he continues, "for kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth, but even by God Himself they are called gods." "As it is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do, so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a king can do or to say that a king cannot do this or that."

Or, to quote the words of a sermon preached before Charles I, royal power "is not a derivation or collection of human power but a participation of God's own omnipotency". Is this not a case of mystical alliance of the human will to power with the Divine, shrouding its claims with the awe-inspiring attribute of participation in divine omnipotence? Certainly the advocates of a materialistic interpretation of history need not lack material to make good their thesis of the materialistic function of religious ideology in our European past. This thesis is written large upon the face of history. The question remains, however, whether this is its only function or even its most essential function.

The great democratic movement which supplanted monarchic concentration of power, was no less inclined to surround itself with the nimbus of a religious ideology. "*Vox populi vox Dei*" is a well-known formula for this ideology. The same claims that Charles I had made for royal power were now made for popular power, namely that it is "a participation of God's own omnipotency". God is working in and

for the people, who accordingly have an infallible instinct for their own true good; their voice is God's voice. We find this attitude as far back as the middle of the seventeenth century, in the democratic enthusiasm of a John Lilburne, who, according to G. P. Gooch, "credited the human unit with more wisdom than he possessed. The 'natural aristocracy' which, as Harrington was to maintain, is the life-blood of successful democratic government, finds no place in the system. He believed scarcely less in the equal capacity than in the equal rights of men." This is the kind of democratic enthusiasm that has swamped the modern world. The idea of "natural goodness" inherent in it has brought it into opposition to traditional religion. In an Edgar Quinet you still find this enthusiasm with a Christian veneer, but as a whole it discarded Christianity and lived on as an independent ideology — which does not mean, however, that it ceased to be religious in quality.

According to the materialistic interpretation of history all these forms of religions or quasi-religions are "ideologies" in the Marxist sense, or "myths" as Georges Sorel, the prophet of syndicalism, preferred to call them. These myths have a tonic value, Sorel pointed out, as inspiring courage and hope in the vital struggle. "One should accept me as a myth," Mussolini, Sorel's disciple, is reported as saying — a myth, we may add, suited to give courage and self-confidence to the Italian people in its imperialistic efforts. That is the function of ideologies, everywhere and always, of whatever class or nation or group.

It should be evident that the whole issue between the materialistic and the humanistic interpretations of

history is brought to a focus in two contradictory conceptions of the nature of man. Every historian, be he conscious of it or not, comes to his documents with some conception of human nature, and the history written by him will be colored by this all-pervading quality. In history, no less than in novel-writing, there is always a "coloring of the news", as the journalists say. You cannot escape it: those novelists who claim to give a picture of life just as it is, who claim to be "realists" with an almost photographic fidelity to reality, will be found upon closer analysis to be the worst of all interpreters. And the same holds true of the historians who claim to tell us, in Ranke's famous phrase, "*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*". They too cannot escape coloring their news, though this news may not be taken, as in the case of the photographic novelist, from the present, but from the past. The purpose of these remarks is, of course, not to obscure the difference between history and fiction. But a process of interpretation of life is inevitable, in the case of the historian no less than in the case of the novelist; and the interpretation depends upon the view of human nature adopted by each writer – for after all, human history is but human nature on a vast scale.

The unphilosophic historian will, of course, keep on telling us that he is not interested in various views of human nature: he just aims to tell the truth about a certain period or a certain development. In the same way a Zola or a Dreiser is wont to tell us that he is just giving us the plain facts, a section of reality, that he is just an honest reporter telling us what he finds, *all* he finds, without disguising anything. We may credit his sincerity – but *what* he finds is dependent

upon what he has organs for perceiving; and there are doubtless plenty of Zolas and Dreisers among our writers of history who are spiritually one-eyed, who have an eye only for the darker aspects of life. The experience of self and the experience of the world are correlative: the view of human nature of the historian no less than of the novelist invariably colors his view of the world at large, whether it be our present world or the worlds of the past.

Just reflect upon that phrase of Ranke's: "*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*"*!* How much there is in this *eigentlich!* We all know about metaphysical doctrines of "true" reality, about the "essence" of things in contrast to illusory "appearance", about the "fundamental" or "ultimate" reality in contrast to the "superficial" aspects of reality. All of this is contained in that *eigentlich – wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.* And it is sheer naïveté not to perceive the logical and epistemological problem hidden in that innocent-seeming word. I cannot here go into technicalities or attempt to discuss this vast issue, but will take the liberty of quoting a sentence from F. C. S. Schiller's *Logic for Use*: "The purposive character of the human mind reveals itself also in this, that it simply *cannot* describe at random. The purpose which animates a description may be trivial or unworthy, its presuppositions may be fantastic or false, but a mind *never* functions with the unintelligent indifference to values of a photographic plate." The sum of our purposes, or our general attitude towards life, inevitably colors all our descriptions. Facts are always selected for a purpose; they are not so much *data* as *sumpta.*

To return to our problem, it is your view of human

nature (*i.e.*, ultimately your experience of your own nature) which inevitably determines *what* you will find to be "basic" or "fundamental" in human nature writ large, *i.e.*, in history. Those who adopt the materialistic interpretation of history – including the fools who adopt it without knowing that they do so – have a materialistic view of human nature. They feel with Hobbes that the "fundamental" thing in human nature is a "desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death"; but they would not believe this if they were contradicted by their own inner experience. Their materialistic self synthesizes the world in terms of itself. They have no organ for perceiving what cannot be perceived in terms of this self. No one can contain more than his own measure, and the materialist cannot absorb more of historical reality than the materialistic aspects of it; and this is for him, therefore, the whole of reality. He is quite sincere when he believes he tells us *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*. Only we may doubt whether his report contains the whole truth; whether the materialist has the organ of perception which would enable him to perceive the higher aspects of reality; whether he is also able to synthesize experience in terms of a higher experience of human nature; whether there is something in him that responds to this higher human nature as he may find it active throughout human history, and which would thus enable him to recognize its existence and activity and importance instead of overlooking it entirely. We may doubt, in short, whether he has within him, developed to any considerable degree, that new dimension of perception or ethical imagination which alone would open up to him another aspect of historical reality.

This higher aspect of historical reality, which the materialistic interpretation of history overlooks, is the aspect of it with which the humanistic interpretation is especially concerned. I mentioned it in the beginning of this paper: it is the will to justice, to human dignity and elevation, to a richness and fullness of life transcending the satisfaction of material desires. This is what the materialistic historian overlooks, for he has an eye only for material desires and their satisfactions, interpreting everything else in terms of them. But in this way he overlooks the factor that has created civilization and alone makes possible its continued existence. He has no organ for perceiving this factor; for the sense of these higher and distinctively human values is undeveloped in him.

"We are much beholden," says Bacon, "to Machiavel and others who wrote what men do and not what they ought to do." There can be no doubt that this approach to history is extraordinarily fruitful, and this type of cynicism has, in fact, much in common with the religious view of human nature. But try to extend it over a whole period like the Middle Ages and you will be aware of its insufficiency. Does anybody believe that a civilization like that of the Middle Ages was built up solely by villainy or that it was, at bottom, nothing but a monstrous jumble of insatiate human desires? Such is no doubt the impression that a Machiavellian historian can manage to give us by directing our attention solely towards what *he* perceives and is qualified to perceive in it. But we feel all the time, just as in the case of a novelist like Zola, that he is blind to the other side of the truth, that his range of vision is really limited to the marketplace and the

gutter. We are told that no man is a hero to his valet, and many historians have an instinct for playing the rôle of the valet. Only we should stop to reflect that the range of vision of the valet may be painfully narrow, and that he may have no organ for perceiving any element of greatness which may actually be present.

Alcibiades had an organ for perceiving the greatness of Socrates, but the four hundred men in the jury that condemned him were all of them "realistic" historians. They lacked the "inner sky-lights", to borrow a phrase from Joubert. Alcibiades had something in him that responded to the appeal of Socrates' greatness. He had that ethical vision which opened up to him a new dimension of perception, or which enabled him — if one prefers to put it that way — to synthesize brute experience in terms of ideal categories, in terms of a higher experience of self. He had an experience of his own inner nature that enabled him to "absorb" more of reality than its sordid outer aspects. And as his experience of self was richer, so his experience of the world was fuller — for these two things are inseparably bound together, and can be distinguished only in abstraction.

According to the humanistic view of history, what an Alcibiades was capable of perceiving in Socrates is precisely the element that holds civilization together and prevents it from disrupting and falling to pieces. And so, from this point of view, the whole of history becomes a struggle between, on the one hand, a sense of higher values, a formative principle working for order, integration, and a truly human civilization, and, on the other hand, the forces of disintegration work-

ing through the unorganized passions of men and the blindness arising out of them. The sense of higher values is taken to be an operative factor in history just as are the material desires of men. The materialistic interpretation only recognizes the latter; but one may ask whether it does not in this way leave out what is the *cement* of all human civilizations that have arisen and will ever arise; whether or not a sense of supermaterial values is operative in men today and has been so in the past, inspiring their efforts to build up a civilization compatible with the nobler desires of our deeper humanity.

The materialistic view of history is but the extension into the past of a materialistic view of human nature; and it is also characteristic that the prolongation into the future of the same view generally takes the form of some kind of humanitarian progressivism intent upon serving the material needs of men. These views all go together as aspects of basic materialism. But those who adopt a different view of human nature must necessarily also adopt a different interpretation of history. And the two interpretations thus arising will forever remain different.

The subject may be further elucidated by turning to a recent and highly interesting paper by Johan Huizinga on "The Concept of History". Various types of civilization, Huizinga says, will forever produce different types of history.

> Every man renders account to himself of the past in accordance with the standards which his education and *Weltanschauung* lead him to adopt. . . . Every civilization creates its own form of history, and must do so. The character of the civilization determines what history shall

mean to it, and of what kind it shall be. . . . The historical interests of every . . . civilization are determined by the question: what are the things which "matter" to it? Civilization has meaning only as a process of adaptation to an end; it is a teleological concept, as history is an explicitly purposive knowing.

Let us stop for a moment before this last quotation and consider its meaning. What does Huizinga mean by saying that history is an explicitly purposive knowing and that civilization is a teleological concept? Let us first consider the materialistic concept of civilization: it means the control of the forces of nature and accordingly the "process of adaptation" to this end. And history is the tracing backwards in time to find how this process of adaptation has come about, what has promoted it, and what has obstructed it. History, thus understood, has reference to an *end*, and is accordingly, in Huizinga's phrase "explicitly purposive knowing". The paper by Huizinga which I am discussing was a contribution to the *Festschrift* for Ernst Cassirer, and it forms in a way — though the author himself does not point it out or perhaps has not noted it — an eloquent exposition of a pregnant passage in Cassirer's discussion of time and memory.

Action [says Cassirer] is always determined and led by the historical consciousness, by retrospection into the past — but on the other hand true historical retrospection arises only out of the forces that are directed toward the future and take part in determining it. Only in so far as the spirit itself grows and develops toward the future can it find its own image in the past. The form of this mirroring, of this reflection, cannot be viewed in isolation from the nature of its striving and its intentions. From

the viewpoint of historical life and historical consciousness the direction toward the past and the direction toward the future cannot be conceived of and treated as elements of an actual opposition but only as elements of an ideal correlation.

Here we have, among other things, the reason why humanitarian progressivism, intent upon the increased satisfaction of the material needs of men, far from being a consequence of a materialistic interpretation of history, is rather a function of it. Neither is a consequence of the other but a function. The looking forward and the looking backward are inseparable where reason is at work:

> *Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,*
> Looking before and after, *gave us not*
> *That capability and god-like reason*
> *To fust in us unused.*

It all depends upon the point of view from which the orientation forwards and backwards takes place. The materialistic and the humanistic points of view are here a world apart. In neither case does god-like reason fust unused, but in the case of the materialist it is instrumental to a materialistic self which is part of a materialistic "civilization", guiding its desires for the future and tracing its history in the past; whereas in the case of the humanist god-like reason, looking before and after, is instrumental to the super-material aims of men, tracing their history in the past and working for their survival in the future.

The distinction between these two views of life and of history becomes evident when we concentrate attention upon the things that "matter" to each of them.

If we take the word "civilization" in a humanistic sense, it is here too a teleological concept, only the end toward which the "process of adaptation" is directed is of a different quality – not primarily a high material standard of living but rather to be understood in an Aristotelian sense as the full realization of the higher potentialities of human nature. Civilization in this sense is what "matters" to the humanist, and history is for him concerned with the tendencies and developments that have promoted or obstructed it in the past. For the humanist, too, history is, in Huizinga's words, "explicitly purposive knowing" inasmuch as it is always referred to, and in a way constituted by, reference to a purpose, an end, a *telos*, which is the full realization of the potentialities of man. Historical reality is apprehended by viewing it against the background of this *telos*, which thus forms the ideal category by which brute experience is worked up and organized into a meaningful whole. Historical knowledge must be reconstructive, but how could one reconstruct, say, a character like Socrates without the use of this ideal category in the synthetic apprehension of the historical documents? How could he otherwise make any human appeal to us? The human nobility of the historical Socrates is a reflection in our historical knowledge of the noblest potentialities we feel in ourselves. In this sense history can tell us only what we can put into it; and the materialistic historian fails to put into it more than his material self. "*Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst.*"

No one would be more willing to apply this word of Goethe's to the study of history than Huizinga:

The past, without further particularization, means merely

chaos. . . . *The* past is limited always in accordance with the kind of subject which seeks to understand it. Every civilization has a past *of its own.* This does not, however, hold in the sense that this past is bounded by the destiny of the group which is the carrier of the civilization, but in the sense that the past can only become history for this group in so far as it is intelligible to it. Civilizations whose outlook is limited or narrow produce a history which is likewise limited and narrow, and contrariwise those whose horizon is wide give rise to a history able to understand a wide range of diversity and even contrast.

We may suspect that Huizinga considers "narrow and limited" a civilization which is only concerned with the material well-being of men, and that he would also apply this epithet to its interpretation of history.

There is an important philosophical consequence that follows from what has been said above. The fact is that a *valuation* coincides with the positing of historical *reality*. As Huizinga phrases it: "The idea of history only emerges with the search for certain connections, the essence of which is determined by the value which we attach to them." History is always the history of *something*. What we look for in the past is the history of those things that are most valuable to us, or as Huizinga phrases it, that "matter" to us. The materialist writes the history of "civilization" in his sense of the word; the humanist likewise puts *his* idea of civilization in the center of his historical investigations and relates everything else to it. Both write the history of what is most valuable to them. How could it be otherwise if it is true, as Cassirer points out, that "truly historical retrospection" is, not indeed a product, but a function of "the forces that are directed to-

wards the future and take part in determining it" — or, to come to the heart of the matter, if both are functions of the central valuation upon which one's view of life is based? The formative principle in every reconstruction of the brute material of historical documents is always a valuation. You cannot give all the facts: you must select the essential ones: and it is here, as Rickert has pointed out, that the valuation comes in. The valuation determines what shall be the "essential" things in history and what shall be its "peripheral" or "superficial" aspects.

There is also, of course, a kind of random fact-gathering which stands in about the same relation to history as does a random collection of flowers to the science of botany. It may be of value as bringing together material for history but it is not history itself. The crisis of modern history, wrote Ernst Troeltsch in his *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (1922), is due not indeed to insufficient access to facts, but to "what one can call the coherence of history and its significance for one's *Weltanschauung*, and the relation is here one of interdependence: *Weltanschauung* is dependent upon history, and history upon *Weltanschauung*". To separate too sharply history and philosophy is to kill both; for the truth is that one's interpretation of the past is a *function* of one's philosophy.

Huizinga's use of language is curious, if he is not actually inconsistent, when, after having expressly stated the importance of valuation in historical scholarship, he nevertheless goes on to define it as an intellectual activity. "History," in the definition at which he arrives, "is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of its past." Why intel-

lectual? There is also, as I have tried to show, using as an illustration the historical reconstruction of a figure like Socrates, an element of *Einfühlung* – in the illustration chosen not of subrational, emotional states but of ethical elevation. This higher sense of transcendent values is also at work in historical apperception and synthesis. And so is, moreover, the emotional self.

Historical apperception is, or should be, an activity of the *whole* personality, not of an aspect of the historian's personality like the intellect. True history can therefore never be "scientific". Nor can it be "impartial" except in a qualified sense; there is truth in Croce's words that "if the historian is to escape from the inevitable necessity of taking a side, he must become a political or scientific eunuch; and history is not an occupation for eunuchs". Only there must be nothing freakish or arbitrary in the unavoidable partiality; the historian must aim at truth – the partiality will take care of itself. For even when he has done his best Faust's words will still apply:

> *Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,*
> *Das ist im Grund der Herren eigner Geist,*
> *In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.*

What the historian finds in history is ultimately his own image. He is like the disciple in Novalis's *Die Lehrlinge zu Sais* who lifted the veil of the inmost sanctuary and found – "wonder of wonders – himself". In this sense – but in no other – it is true that history, like Jarno in Goethe's novel, never condescends to argue with you but only provides you with abundant illustrations of what you believe.

Modern science began with a complete devotion to objectivity. Just as the artistic mind of the Renaissance

expanded over the world in self-forgetful devotion to its beauty, so the new science wished to submerge itself in outer nature and pattern itself upon it as a glove is patterned upon the hand. But history teaches a strange lesson: the deeper the human spirit penetrated into physical nature, the more it found itself enmeshed in constructions of its own making, until finally Kant was able to sum up the movement in his famous doctrine that reason legislates for nature. What human reason found in nature was – wonder of wonders – itself. A parallel account may be written for the historical sciences. Only in history, dealing with human life in all its qualitative variety, it is not just the intellect, but the *whole* of the historian's personality that finds its image in the world – in his case the world of the past. And the richer and more truly human the historian's personality, the closer will he be to the only kind of historical objectivity that a finite being can attain.

For a concrete illustration of what I mean by the humanistic philosophy of history I would turn to a nineteenth-century English historian, James Anthony Froude. Froude had grave faults as a historian. He was, according to an authoritative statement,

> constitutionally inaccurate, and seems to have been unable to represent the exact sense of a document which lay before him, or even to copy from it correctly. [Yet] his successes must be set against his failures. At least he wrote a great history, one which can never be disregarded by future writers on his period, be their opinions what they may; which attracts and delights a multitude of readers, and is a splendid example of literary form and grace in historical composition.

For our present purposes Froude's faults are wholly irrelevant. His philosophy of history would have remained what it was if he had been more accurate, and if his work had been less marred by the violence of his anti-Catholic sentiment. Indeed, he himself explicitly condemns idiosyncracies of this type, and there is no justification whatever to be found for them in his theoretical principles.

Probably no one would have been more astonished than Froude himself at the assertion — or, as he would say, accusation — that he held a philosophy of history. In fact, philosophies of history were his pet aversion. Even more troublesome than those who falsify the facts, he says, are the philosophers giving us views of history corresponding to their speculative theories. His point of view was the ordinary one among historians: just present the facts and let the reader judge for himself!

> Wherever possible, let us not be told *about* this man or that. Let us hear the man himself speak, let us see him act, and let us be left to form our own opinions about him. The historian, we are told, must not leave his readers to themselves. He must not only lay the facts before them — he must tell them what he himself thinks about those facts. In my opinion, this is precisely what he ought not to do. Bishop Butler says somewhere, that the best book which could be written would be a book consisting only of premisses, from which the readers should draw conclusions for themselves.

That the selection of premisses could constitute a problem did not occur to Froude. Shakespeare's "purely objective" presentation of life was, in fact, what Froude set up for the historian to imitate. Shake-

speare let the reader form his own theories: "He may be a Yorkist or a Lancastrian, rationalist or orthodox, a believer in kings and nobles, or in peoples and the march of intellect, he will find his own side of the matter represented more favorably than he could represent it himself."

How ironical – and how typical – it is, that this anti-philosophic historian can himself be shown to hold a definite philosophy of history! Froude believed that the historian should disengage his mind from all theories and write simply from the point of view of ordinary common sense. But what did "common sense" mean to him?

> One lesson, and only one [says this opponent of all philosophy of history] history may be said to repeat with distinctness; that the world is built somehow on moral foundations; that, in the long run, it is well with the good; in the long run, it is ill with the wicked. But this is no Science; it is no more than the old doctrine taught long ago by the Hebrew prophets.

It is no science, and – he would also have added – it is no philosophy. Yet it *is* somehow a philosophy to believe that the world is built on moral, rather than on, say, economic foundations; and this will be abundantly evident when we find out what Froude meant by "moral foundations". First of all he rejects the economic and, more broadly, the materialistic interpretation of history in all its forms. He refuses to accept the theory that all actions whatsoever arise from self-interest. Adam Smith, in laying the foundations of political economy, had eliminated every other motive, and what Adam Smith had said of political

economy, Buckle applied to the whole circle of human activity. But for Froude there was also another factor at work in history, in society and in man which could not be accounted for on materialistic postulates:

> . . . That which especially distinguishes a high order of man from a low order of man – that which constitutes human goodness, human greatness, human nobleness – is surely not the degree of enlightenment with which men pursue their own advantage; . . . it is self-forgetfulness – it is self-sacrifice – it is the disregard of personal pleasure, personal indulgence, personal advantages remote or present, because some other line of conduct is more right.

Here we have a clear-cut ethical dualism; two radically distinct factors are operative in human history: on the one hand self-interest, enlightened and unenlightened, on the other hand a higher factor of "self-sacrifice", producing all there is of human goodness, human greatness, human nobleness. And these two factors are not just distinct, but absolutely different; Froude rejects all rationalizing reconciliations of this dualism, all attempts to explain the higher factor in terms of the lower as only a more subtle form of basic selfishness.

> Is this still selfishness, only more enlightened? I do not think so. The essence of true nobility is neglect of self. Let the thought of self pass in, and the beauty of a great action is gone – like the bloom from a soiled flower. . . . And out of this mysterious quality, whatever it be, arise the higher relations of human life, the higher modes of human obligation. . . . Right, the sacrifice of self to good; wrong, the sacrifice of good to self; – not graduated objects of desire, to which we are determined by the degrees of our knowledge, but wide asunder as pole and

pole, as light and darkness – one, the object of infinite love; the other, the object of infinite detestation and scorn.

The lower element of man's dual nature is accordingly "selfishness", or expansive desire; the higher element is a negation of all selfishness, or "self-sacrifice". This higher factor makes itself felt in self-mastery and volitional effort; and the religious man will tend to believe that this higher will is not human at all but God's grace working in man. Froude's psychology of religious experience is built upon his dualism:

> Light breaks more clearly on him. He becomes conscious of impulses toward something purer and higher than he has yet experienced or even imagined. Whence these impulses come he cannot tell. He is too keenly aware of the selfish and cowardly thoughts which rise up to mar and thwart his nobler aspirations to believe that they can possibly be his own. *If he conquers his baser nature, he feels that he is conquering himself. The conqueror and the conquered cannot be the same; and he therefore concludes, not in vanity, but in profound humiliation and self-abasement, that the infinite grace of God and nothing else is rescuing him from destruction.* He is converted, as the theologians say. He sets his face upon another road from that which he has hitherto travelled, and to which he can never return. It has been no merit of his own. His disposition will rather be to exaggerate his own worthlessness, that he may exalt the more what has been done for him. . . . (My italics.)

A scientific explanation of history is impossible for a double reason; "not only is there in men this baffling duality of principle", but there is something else in us which also defies scientific analysis. This is the

unaccountable element of change and diversity in life: each new generation is a continual surprise, and the Fates delight to contradict our most confident expectations. But still less can science fathom and explain the activity of that higher element of human nature which produces all there is of human goodness and nobility.

If it is free to a man to chose what he will do or not do, there is no adequate science of him. [Whatever the future of science will be] this only we may foretell with confidence – that the riddle of man's nature will remain unsolved. There will be that in him yet which physical laws will fail to explain – that something, whatever it be, in himself, and in the world, which science cannot fathom, and which suggests the unknown possibilities of his origin and destiny.

There will remain yet

> *High instincts, before which our mortal nature*
> *Doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised.*

A science of history is made impossible by the presence in man of those "high instincts" of self-sacrifice and limitation of desires:

Even the laws of political economy itself cease to guide us when they touch moral government. So long as labor is a chattel to be bought and sold, so long, like other commodities, it follows the conditions of supply and demand. But if, for his misfortune, an employer considers that he stands in human relations toward his workmen . . . then political economy will no longer direct him, and the relations between himself and his dependents will have to be arranged on other principles.

As soon as there enters an element of self-sacrifice in life, science is baffled.

So long as a man considers only his own material profit, so long supply and demand will settle every difficulty: but the introduction of a new factor spoils the equation. And it is precisely in this debatable ground of low motives and noble emotions — in the struggle, ever failing, yet ever renewed, to carry truth and justice into the administration of human society . . . that the true human interest of history resides.

The humanist, as we phrased it above, is interested in the history of "civilization" in *his* sense of the word. For him two factors are at work in human life, the one creating order out of chaos, the other providing the rebellious material upon which order is to be imposed; and the struggle between these two principles is the perennial drama of human history. Where the higher principle is active, there, and only there, is liberty possible.

As in personal morality liberty is self-restraint, and self-indulgence is slavery, so political freedom is possible only where justice is in the seat of authority, where all orders and degrees work in harmony with the organic laws which man neither made nor can alter — where the unwise are directed by the wise, and those who are trusted with power use it for the common good. A country so governed is a free country, be the form of the constitution what it may. A country not so governed is in bondage, be its suffrage never so universal.

Man, Froude felt, has to adapt himself not only to the world of everyday experience, but also to a moral world-order which reveals itself to him in his conscience. For there are "laws by which mankind are governed — laws which exist, whether we acknowledge them or whether we deny them, and will have

their way, to our weal or woe, according to the attitude in which we please to place ourselves toward them – inherent, like electricity, in the nature of things, not made by us, not to be altered by us, but to be discerned and obeyed by us at our everlasting peril". The moral world-order is a fact; and fact, as Froude says, "if it cannot otherwise secure a hearing, expresses itself at last in bayonets and bursting shells".

In *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* we find the statement that Froude "condemns a scientific treatment of history and disregards its philosophy". The former is true, but what about the latter? Such has no doubt been the impression produced by his polemics not only against the idea of a "science of history", but also against the philosophy of history in general. He would, moreover, have whole-heartedly accepted this statement himself. He held that he wrote simply from the point of view of common sense. We may grant this, yet at the same time insist that Froude's "common sense" is in itself a philosophy. When he praises Shakespeare's "purely objective" way of picturing life, what he really means is that Shakespeare presented life truthfully and objectively as seen from the point of view of Froudian common sense.

> He represents real life. His dramas teach as life teaches – neither less nor more. He builds his fabrics as nature does, on right and wrong: but he does not struggle to make nature more systematic than she is. . . . The greatness of the poet depends on his being true to nature, without insisting that nature should theorize with him, without making her more just, more philosophical, more moral than reality; and, in difficult matters, leaving much to reflection which cannot be explained.

The historian, like the poet, says Froude, should be purely objective and present life as it actually is. His supreme duty is to be rigorously true to the facts, never forcing them into any mold or adapting them to a preconceived theory. He should learn from Shakespeare. "And Shakespeare's attitude toward human life will become again attainable to us, only when intelligent people can return to an agreement on first principles – when the common sense of the wisest and best among us has superseded the theorizing of factions and parties – when the few but all-important truths of our moral condition, which can be certainly known, have become the exclusive rule of our judgements and actions. . . ." If we adopt this point of view our interpretation of history will be "purely objective". And it is of such purely objective history, or history interpreted by "the common sense of the wisest and best among us", that Froude speaks in the sentence from which we started out: "One lesson, and only one, history may be said to repeat with distinctness: that the world is somehow built on moral foundations. . . ."

Such history, written from the point of view of the wisest and best among us, appeals not only to the intellect but to a deeper stratum of human nature: "The address of history is less to the understanding than to the higher emotions. We learn in it to sympathize with what is great and good; we learn to hate what is base." In it "we escape from the littlenesses which cling to the round of common life, and our minds are tuned in a higher and nobler key". Historical reality is not apprehended just by the intellect; the *whole* of the human personality enters into its apprehension. For

Froude, as we see, value was an integral part of historical reality; it was not for him a question of valuation supervening upon reality from the outside; it was for him a question of "what *is* great and good" and "what *is* base". Ethical value was for him a constitutive element of historical reality; and that is why merely the understanding was not enough for the apprehension of historical truth. Had he been acquainted with those discussions of *Geschichtslogik*, which form such an important part of the modern German *Methodenstreit der Geisteswissenschaften*, he would have insisted that historical apperception is more than just "thinking" in any legitimate sense of the word, and hence largely outside the proper field of logic. He would have pointed out that there is also a kind of super-rational perception or ethical imagination at work in historical apperception as he conceived it. Or, if he had retained the word logic, he would have agreed with those who would promote an effective emancipation of the logic of the *Geisteswissenschaften* from the methodology of natural science.

In modern books on the philosophy of history I have not yet found a single reference to the philosophy of history that Froude held, still less, of course, to Froude himself. Writers on the subject – who seem to read chiefly one another's books – are evidently not aware of the existence or even the possibility of such a rival to the materialistic interpretation of history and society. It is a philosophy of history which is based upon a definite type of experience of free will, and which flows from it as an inevitable consequence.

# A Note on Europe

Carl Schmitt

We Americans make little attempt to understand the contemporary European scene. Several generations which have either been Puritan or, being other, have lived in a Puritan environment (in a land where environment strongly affects men) have produced a people which are bound to a great degree to be left outside the main problems of objective religion and government. Our Puritan society tends to "liquidate" its peasantry. Man's exchange value becomes more important than his creative value. He, as it were, gradually kills his social roots and thus withdraws himself from communion with those societies normal to Europe, which are rooted in a peasantry, such as Italy, France, Belgium, and Ireland.

For, over these societies at least, the bourgeoisie (or anti-bourgeoisie) can have no permanent leadership: their roots lie too solidly in a peasantry. Thus Fascism in Italy, although beginning with a strong anti-bourgeois feeling, quickly became pro-peasant. Normal societies tend to "swallow" the bourgeoisie when it threatens to dominate; tend to master it rather than destroy. The peasantry throws up a new nobility in such crises and re-establishes a healthy organism, not by "liquidating" its bourgeoisie, but by once again putting its middle class in its normal place: that is, in the middle. A fundamentally sound

organism readjusts itself. That process has been going on for centuries in the Roman Society. It may be said that the social will of Europe is constantly to maintain organic proportion: to keep its peasant roots that it may be redeemed by its nobility in a crisis. For a nobility is not a permanent thing like a root peasantry. It is more like a seed flower, which is seasonal. It saves a society by propagating it: it goes to make new roots; its shell only remains on the parent plant.

In the European society the peasant is distinguished by his credulity. Thus religion also has its roots in the peasant. "Unless you become as little children you cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven" is socially an admonition that we should never destroy the peasant. He, the peasant, in critical times throws up from his ignorant credulity the true noble, who, like the peasant believes within his heart, but, unlike the peasant, believes within his intelligence as well. The peasant is too simple to exchange his soul for the world: the noble is too wise. The bourgeoisie, or "classes" (and here it is necessary to repeat that neither the peasantry nor the nobility are a class: they have no "class" – the word snob is derived from the Latin, *sine nobilitate* – it is their mark that they are not class-conscious), in European society, on the other hand, are distinguished by another necessary kind of faith: urbane faith. By their mundane tolerance and habits of regularity, they conserve a religion "created" by the peasant and "redeemed" by the noble in destructive seasons. But when the faith of the bourgeoisie goes, it goes for a comfortable worldly consideration and not violently to the Devil.

Spain, however, is peculiar in this: while she is close to Rome and has the civilized organism of Rome, she has also and equally strongly a barbaric violence in her blood and in her air, which moves her cruelly to periodic reaction. Her creation is fierce and her criticism is equally so. There is a semi-barbaric exaggeration in her peasantry and nobility. When she reacts from faith in times of stress, her extreme credulity can only go in one direction: extreme atheism. As a result, in her social aspect she moves violently from exaggerated hierarchic discipline into the opposite camp of anarchy. If we pity her (and who does not?) in the violent issue of her rebirth, we must also remember that every variation in human characteristics is compensated: she will swing as rapidly and violently back to her almost fanatical faith: she is spared the slow and insidious rot which more easily jeopardizes redemption. And if her sorrow is intense, so shall be her joy.

In a Roman Society, such as France, where "class" plays a more important part than it does in Spain or Italy, the reaction away from faith assumes on the whole a different form than atheism. Bourgeois urbanity in its old age produces scepticism, which may be said to be a respectable and reserved loss of faith. The degrees of scepticism are infinite, unlike the black-and-white of atheism; it is very difficult to mark the point where a gray becomes more black than white. For this reason, the breakdown in France from order to chaos is much more slow and insidious—how far can one compromise without being compromised?

None the less, upon the French issue hangs the

whole. Spain is in a sense partially outside the camp of permanent values; she dramatizes the issue vividly on the stage of time. But France is the very structure, the fixed and permanent building-stone of the social order. Fundamentally it is a French Era which is drawing to a close. The last thousand years of history have seen the rise of all that is socially fine in man and the decline into all that is socially rotten in his nature. If to French genius must go much of the honor of that rise, so in terms of the French genius can we best typify its decay. And in France must we await its fall.

It is like some Gothic cathedral which threatens to collapse. How slowly or rapidly it will do so we do not know. What we do know is that the massive Romanesque crypt will remain. Under the rubbish will lie the old foundation of the new building.

# REVIEWS

## Britain's Use of America*

It is pretty much of a commonplace that in international affairs the United States follows the lead of Great Britain. This, the average man assumes, is as it should be: we are, by and large, an "isolationist" nation; we have not a great deal to gain or lose from foreign happenings and we cannot therefore keep so close an eye on them as nations to whom they are of great moment; and we do well to accept the leadership — retaining every right of veto — of a nation that resembles us in all things but its isolation. For, it is reasoned, are not we and Britain the last powerful representatives of liberal democracy, the last believers in the splendid freedom and equality of opportunity that reside in the capitalist system? From such an arrangement we have everything to gain, nothing to lose; we are on the side of the angels and we have the benefit of the Angle's superior experience in statecraft; in so far as we join the English, it is bound to be in a noble cause (since ours is a penchant for noble causes) but we need join them in no cause that will not show a due return of profit.

Quincy Howe begins his book with a statement which indicates that he does not hold these ties so easily revocable: "What happens to the United States during the twentieth century depends primarily upon

* ENGLAND EXPECTS EVERY AMERICAN TO DO HIS DUTY *by Quincy Howe* (SIMON & SCHUSTER. 238 pp. $2.00).

what happens to the British Empire." And the reason for this, says Mr. Howe, is the weakness of the British Empire. The causes of the Empire's weakness are far-reaching – they are implicit in its very geographical extent – and their origins are both near and distant in time. The most striking weakness is Britannia's loss of absolute rule over the waves. The sonambulist Armada that was mocked recently by Mussolini's sea-sleds, in Wyndham Lewis's vivid phrase, no longer by its very presence inspires the terror that once safeguarded British capital at the ends of the earth. That capital, too, is not what it was. In sheer wealth, Britain is probably as great as she ever was; but her wealth is now in a form less easy of defense and – what is the same thing – less usable for coercion. England is no longer the "workshop of the world"; the world, on the whole, is industrialized, and there are nations who produce where England once sold, and others still who sell cheap where England once sold dear. England now exports chiefly, not her manufactured products, but her capital; she lives on interest, or usury, rather than on the profits of her industrial produce. For this reason, the world does not depend on England for what are considered the necessaries of a full life, and England lacks the power which at one time was hers as the source of these things.

Along with the diminution of Britain's power, Mr. Howe points out, has gone a rise in the power of other countries. In the East, where lie the richest of her possessions and the most lucrative of her zones of influence, Japan now stands as a rival, with an industrial and military power that is no mere threat

— as the silent Lancashire mills and the insults so stolidly borne at Shanghai testify. The Mediterranean is scarcely the British sea it was before Mussolini again set up the Roman Empire in Africa; and that Empire now abuts the land boundary of a major power upon British territory — which is something new (the United States excluded) in British history. In India nationalism grows, and, in a feeble gesture, England has already conceded the Indians a measure of self-government, if only such self-government as they will enjoy under the rule of the Babu politicians. This concession, in Mr. Howe's opinion, is England's choice of the lesser of two evils, the other evil being the possibility of a Communist revolution following on wide discontent amongst the natives. The case of China resembles that of India, in Mr. Howe's estimation: there Britain has had to lend support to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist movement — with its possibilities, slight though they be, of an independent China — to offset the greater danger of a Soviet-instigated upheaval. (At present, however, Kuomintang and Soviets seem to be presenting a United Front.)

On the European continent England likewise faces great difficulties. These difficulties Mr. Howe analyzes less clearly than he does the colonial ones; for he has a soft spot in his heart for Russia (though not of the melting-butter consistency of your orthodox Stalinist) and for the Spanish Reds, and he has some difficulties in reconciling British policy with the arch-capitalist rôle (that is, opposed to any kind of social revolution) he conceives Britain as playing. We may leave it to him that England everywhere plays the rôle of the capitalist, financial and industrial, but

make the reservation that this is not inconsistent with desiring a divided Spain (the only possible "Red" Spain) and a Soviet Russia which will carry on Russia's old part of being a potent bogey for the use of her Western allies. Perhaps it is too much to ask of anyone that in describing England's Continental policy he do much more than say it is desperate: it seems to waver with each morning's news and displays only such principle as may be embodied in the determination to get out of a tight hole at any cost, but preferably the least. This much is plain: England has to figure with an Italy and a Germany, both reinvigorated and determined on a self-sufficient economy that shall make them impervious to Britain's most potent weapon — credit; a Spain which, if it becomes a strong state under Franco, may prove another hazard on the life-line of the Empire, or which, if Moscow establishes its Rosenbergs and Klebers there, may prove a source of infection to the European body politic; and a France which is as uncertain an ally as any nation on the eve of revolution can be. In all these things, what England most fears is the likely tomorrow, for today is at least sufferable.

At home all is not well either. Capitalism, older in England than anywhere else, has progressed about as far as it is possible to go in disparity of wealth; the English masses are proletarianized beyond those of any other European country — and this has been their condition for several generations. As a result they are physically far below the norm, and the greater proportion of those who offer themselves for service in the Army must be rejected. At the same time, not many offer themselves for Army service:

proletarianism, in its old age, brings with it a decrease in morale, and men show small eagerness to defend the system which has degraded them. Inevitable with the lessening of vitality, is a decline in the birth rate, so that population experts look toward an England whose numbers will fall by half in a century. Wealth usuriously accumulates and men decay; but not the man at the top of the scale – the ruling oligarchy of Britain is still firmly in its place, so far as Britain is concerned, and there, by all portents, it will remain so long as the capitalist system dictates world politics and, as the disciples of Major Douglas put it, the octopus of Debt is fastened on the world.

From all this it is evident that England's welfare depends on the maintenance of the *status quo*, as established by the Treaty of Versailles. What forces are operating against the *status quo*, so far as England is concerned, we have seen above. The one nation which has no protest against the *status quo*, and is not likely to have, is the United States, after Great Britain, the greatest of the world powers. Alone, England cannot withstand the forces that are working for her destruction. She has allies in Europe, but they are all uncertain – in both senses of the word, no doubt, for they must know from experience that to be England's ally is not always an enviable position. The United States, then, has all the qualifications needed in England's ideal ally, and we have, in especial, a common language and a common cultural heritage – two things making us particularly malleable for the purposes of English propaganda. Representative Dickstein has made us all sensitively aware to the dangers of foreign propaganda, that is,

Communist and Nazi propaganda. So far we have done little about the former, and the dangers of the latter seem to exist chiefly in the imagination of Mr. Dickstein, which, concentrating on Germany, displays a not surprising fervidness. But the propaganda which works on us most effectively, and from which we therefore stand in greatest danger, has gone unnoticed. This is English propaganda and Mr. Howe has performed a valuable service in showing in some detail how it works.

There is not space here to enumerate at length all the examples of English propaganda which Mr. Howe adduces, but a few salient items may be presented in support of his thesis that "England expects every American to do his duty". Mr. Howe goes back to the nineteenth century and finds in the Monroe Doctrine the first instance of America's serving British ends: the doctrine, he says, was "a purely British device whereby we underwrote Britain's stake in Latin America" – which is certainly true of its practical effects, whatever its historical genesis. Likewise, the Open Door policy in China commits the American armed forces to the defense of what are chiefly British interests in the East. Our sizeable navy, in Mr. Howe's estimation, far exceeds the necessities of defense, and we have built it up to its present size, and established our naval bases in the Pacific, because of the possibility of war with Japan – a result of our adherence to the Open Door policy. It is true that we are to some extent a commercial rival of Japan's in China, but we have a great deal less to lose by Japan's penetration there than has Britain; in fact the most serious loss we face in Asia is one of trade

with Japan, with whom we do a far greater volume of business than we do with China.

The financial policies of the White House since the War, with the exception of the Coolidge administration, played into British hands. President Hoover, "who became a millionaire working for British mining and engineering companies in the Far East", by his famous Moratorium carried out, whether wittingly or not, the suggestions of the Balfour note — that, in exchange for England's not collecting her War Loans, the United States should not insist on England's payment of her debts to us. Since the English loans and debts were about equal, Mr. Howe points out, this was a neat device whereby the English debt was saddled on the American taxpayer. Again, by refusing to devalue the dollar and clinging to the gold standard, President Hoover put the dollar at great disadvantage with the pound on the foreign market, "and largely because the President had made it possible for the British government to manipulate the American gold reserve, revival in England and recession in America went hand in hand". The general trend of President Roosevelt's currency policy has been away from anything that would allow competition with England either in foreign trade or loans; while all his statements on other aspects of international affairs show that whither England leads he is usually willing to follow. And the "cash and carry" neutrality legislation in effect amounts to this: that only Great Britain could afford to be America's customer in times of war.

The ways in which we are led to do what Britain wishes us to do are various: much is accomplished

by British propaganda and British cleverness, and much doubtless follows from the Anglophile inclinations of our statesmen. The House of Morgan, the most powerful single financial influence in America, is notoriously pro-British, not only because that way lies profit, but also because the American financier seems unable to divest himself of a certain *parvenu* feeling which makes him meekly submit to the dictation of the longer-established British oligarch. This American promptness to bow before the superior majesty of the British, our "cousins" are quick to avail themselves of: English "notables" endlessly carry to our shores the message of Anglo-Saxon culture, the message usually being that this culture is sore beset and hands must be joined across the sea to save it. It was, for instance, no accident that Oxford accents began to be heard on all our lecture platforms when there seemed danger of a war over the Ethiopian contretemps — no more than it was an accident that the B. B. C. refused to rebroadcast to America an Italian spokesman's presentation of Italy's case. *The New York Times*, which forms American opinion on foreign affairs more than any other newspaper, is pro-British; a high proportion of its European and Asian correspondents are British citizens and Dr. John Finley, the editor, is a fervent member of the English-Speaking Union. The number of Americans in important public positions who are members of the English-Speaking Union is large, and an examination of the careers of these men — publicists, bankers, educators, former government officials — reveals they are Anglophile in more ways than a mere admiration of English "tradition" — consciously or unconsciously

(and probably the latter), they have all done their bit for the material interests of the Empire. The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Foreign Policy Association reveal much the same complexion.

What is to be done about all this? asks Mr. Howe. Isolation and socialism are his answers. He offers a plan whereby American capital abroad may be withdrawn, and he suggests that we grant independence to our colonial possessions. Along with this, he would have us reduce our Army and Navy. That the American economy strictly requires neither great foreign investments nor extensive foreign possessions seems true; that we should reduce our armed forces merely to leave Britain less to fall back on in her hour of need is of doubtful wisdom. His plea for a socialist United States does not need criticism here: Mr. Howe merely states briefly that it would make for a happy self-sufficient country, with an ever-increasing general prosperity, while abroad less fortunate nations would continue to groan under Fascist dictators or go down hill with capitalism. Mr. Howe, though not an orthodox Leftist, is not so orthodox as to fail to equate decadent capitalism with Fascism – Britain, he says, may yet go Fascist if the need comes, and will move in that direction still flaunting the banner of democracy. But without stopping to define the exact nature of Fascism, we can see that Britain today stands opposed to the Fascist interests; that she stands on the side of Democracy only to the extent that democracy is the hollow concomitant of capitalism which it everywhere is; that to endure as an Empire she must make capitalism endure, which means the system of oppression, proletarianism, and debt that so

many men now groan under, and to escape which they may yet destroy our civilization itself, in their rage pulling down the good with the bad. Capitalism — which means the present British world system — must collapse out of its own inherent contradiction; we have been told this by its acutest critics, both of the Left and of the Right; but whether this collapse is of the nature of a catastrophe, exploding in the Marxian horror, or of a gentler easing into a more human system depends upon the men and ideas that gain control in our day. The policies of the present rulers of Great Britain are directed on the catastrophic path, and Mr. Howe's book is of high value in pointing out that America should not allow herself to be led in that direction, no matter what blandishments may be used upon her.

GEOFFREY STONE

## Sublimated Utilitarianism*

READERS of Prof. Stace's previous books and articles will anticipate in the present work two outstanding qualities: in style, an extreme simplicity and directness; and in thought, a genius that is primarily systematic, even when dealing with historical problems. *The Concept of Morals* is simple, direct, and of a most refreshing candor; and it is quite strictly a work in systematic Ethics. The author hoes his own row, largely in independence of historic philosophy. His knowledge of the history of philosophy, which is certainly at the back of his mind, remains at the back

* THE CONCEPT OF MORALS *by W. T. Stace* (MACMILLAN. 307 pp. $2.25).

of his mind, to be drawn forth at intervals only, for the illumination of some specific problem.

The part of history with which Prof. Stace is most nearly concerned is the present, and it is from the present situation in Ethics that he takes off. The field of ethical theory he sees as divided between "absolutists" and "relativists"; and neither of these camps can provide the modern man with the doctrine that he needs. "Absolutism is dead", as are all systems of morality founded upon religious sanctions: any theory of this kind is simply unacceptable to modern minds, and "absolutism" continues to be mouthed only by cloistered professors of philosophy who have fallen grievously behind the times. On the other hand, "ethical relativity", as Mr. Stace loses no time in showing, simply "makes nonsense" of the moral life. What men *understand* by the pursuit of goodness becomes impossible, if this "goodness" be conceived merely in terms of group standards, which vary from age to age and from place to place. On the basis of relativity, there is no conceivable sense in which Christian ethics are higher than the ethics of the Hottentot; they are simply different. If nowhere there is a common standard, valid for humanity as a whole, then moral progress (or moral devolution) becomes the hollowest of illusions. Prof. Stace is fully aware of the effect which ethical relativity will have upon society, once it is given the chance to prevail. The individuals who frame a doctrine of this sort may well escape its corrosive influence — even their children may. But through the years it will take a dreadful toll.

Since Prof. Stace is bent primarily upon developing a systematic theory of his own, he is under no

obligation to examine all rival views; otherwise, he might be criticized for drawing the issue thus sharply, and omitting to mention certain more moderate positions – *e.g.*, that of the Oxford Intuitionists (on the Right) and (on the Left) that of the more rational of the Logical Positivists. The opposition which he does draw is certainly not unreal; it does exist. Of relativism, in the broad sense, Prof. Stace has given us a sufficient refutation. Of "absolutism", however, he has merely said that it is old-fashioned; and we should therefore be on our guard. We should look to see whether Prof. Stace has really disposed of absolutism, or whether its primary emphasis reappears in his own theory. The latter seems to me to be the case.

In his own mind, however, the author is convinced of the necessity for avoiding both extremes. We must show morality to be "universal, but not absolute". This means that although "our (human) morality is relative to our (human) nature", still within this framework of human nature it is absolute. "By a universal morality I mean one which applies, not merely to this race or that during this age or that, but to all humanity in all ages." If a race of supermen should arrive upon the scene, this morality would not be valid for them; but as long as men remain men, its validity is assured. For again:

> What do we *mean* by a universal morality? We do *not* mean a moral principle which is, as a matter of empirical fact, believed and approved by all men. We mean a moral principle which is *applicable* to all men in the sense that, even if they do not accept it, they *ought* to do so. What we have to show is that the same moral obligation in

reality falls upon all men. We do not have to show that all men know what this obligation is, or that there is among them any agreement about the matter. We have to show that what really *is* right is the same for all men. . . .

The way in which this is to be accomplished is strictly limited by Prof. Stace's analysis of the word "ought". Although he uses it frequently and with emphasis (as in the foregoing quotation), he agrees with the Logical Positivists that it must bear "an empirical meaning" or else no meaning at all. The Moral Law, and all other statements containing the word "ought", cannot therefore be left in the "ought" form; they must be reduced to the "is" form, to statements of fact. The assertion that all men "ought" to conform to the same morality must then be translated into the assertion (a) that all men *do as a matter of fact* have certain universal needs in common, and (b) that these needs *can as a matter of fact* be satisfied only by conforming to this one morality. This reduction, forming the basis of a strictly "natural ethic", is surely convincing at first sight; and a "natural ethic", such as Prof. Stace sets forth, may be unexceptionable as far as it goes. The soul no doubt has "needs" that are satisfied only by morality, just as it has "needs" that are satisfied only by God: we may speak in these terms, all along the line, if we so choose. But we must recognize, at the same time, a certain prime difference among "needs". There are needs which are actually or explicitly felt as such by all men; and there are again needs that are explicitly felt as such by some men only. The former are "universal" in the strict, empirical sense; the latter may be

called "universal" *only upon a hypothesis* – the hypothesis, namely, that what is explicit in some men may be presumed to operate implicitly in all. If it is the former kind of need that mortality subserves, then our ethic will be not only "natural", but naturalistic; while if it is the latter kind, it will not be properly "natural" at all.

The question is, then, which kind of "universal need" Prof. Stace has in mind, when he says that there are such needs, of which morality is the only satisfaction. And on this crucial point he wavers. His empiricism draws him in one direction (toward the kind of needs that are actually or explicitly universal); and his moral sense draws him in the other (toward the kind of needs that are only implicitly universal, or universal under an hypothesis). Now the "need" in question is the sort of thing that any natural scientist could investigate, and is closely identified with impulse or sentiment; and now it is a nearly mystical notion – a final End or Value which *must* simply be acknowledged as such – which *demands* acknowledgment – but which *is* as a matter of fact so acknowledged by all too few of us. We may call these two views the "low" and the "high" view respectively.

The "high" view comes forth most clearly in Prof. Stace's account of "happiness". All men desire happiness, and all strive toward it. The author takes his stand, therefore, upon the basic Utilitarian doctrine that the end of human action is happiness and that actions are not right or wrong in themselves, but according as they promote happiness or fail to promote it – according as they are means to this end. What then is "happiness"? Prof. Stace firmly rejects the

view that it is a sum or aggregate of pleasures. But neither, he thinks, is it an "unanalyzable ultimate". We can enumerate certain "satisfactions" – such as health, material comfort, a measure of leisure and relaxation, the affection of family and friends – which contribute to happiness, as Aristotle contended; but happiness is not merely the sum of these particular satisfactions. "We must say, on the contrary, that happiness is one thing and that satisfactions are quite another thing. . . . Once we get clear in our minds the conception that we may have in our souls on the one hand a set of satisfactions; and on the other hand a state of happiness; and that these two are quite distinct; and we shall have made an enormous stride forward towards the understanding of a number of ethical problems."

If we try to explain this duality of satisfactions and happiness, there are two considerations that will help us. "In the first place, there is something in the individual personality of each man which determines the degree of his happiness independently of any satisfactions which he has or does not have. Some men seem to be born happy, others to be born unhappy. . . ." And in the second place "some satisfactions . . . contribute more to happiness, others less". What a satisfaction contributes to happiness does not depend upon the intensity of the satisfaction, as the cruder of the Utilitarians thought, but upon its "specific nature" – *i.e.*, "that character of it which distinguishes it from other kinds of satisfaction". No law can be stated which helps us to understand *why* a satisfaction of one specific nature yields more happiness than a satisfaction of another specific nature. We

simply find in experience that it is so. It is a brute fact. . . . The connection between *this* specific nature and *this* value is not a connection of implication of logical necessity. We have to "wait on experience", as Hume would have expressed it, to discover what value is attached to what specific nature. It is simply a fact that bodily satisfactions yield little happiness (that is, are of low value). And this fact had to be discovered in experience by long generations of men . . . There is no conceivable reason why the facts should be as they are. . . .

This discussion of "happiness" is crucial to Prof. Stace's position. And the significant thing is that "happiness" does after all turn out to be an "unanalyzable ultimate", as unanalyzable as "good" is for the Intuitionist (and absolutist!) G. E. Moore. If happiness "lies outside satisfactions", as Mr. Stace tells us it does, and is the standard by which these satisfactions are judged higher or lower, then we shall simply have to *accept* this standard as absolute Value, without demonstrating it in any way. All ultimate values are by definition *acknowledged* — they are never proved. Prof. Stace insists over and over again that it is "self-evident" that we should seek our own happiness, and that the only mystery is why we should seek the happiness of others. But this is not really self-evident at all; and, as a matter of fact, true happiness *is* sought by comparatively few. The *roué* would not even understand the "happiness" which Prof. Stace has set forth, much less desire it; just so, bad men would be bored and unhappy in Heaven. The reduction of "oughtness" to "isness" will not hold water in the end. For all men *do not as a matter of fact* desire hap-

piness, conceived as Mr. Stace conceives it. No doubt they *ought* to desire this happiness, but *actually they do not*. And to say merely that they "ought" to desire it is to render the "reduction" of no effect.

It is extraordinary that Prof. Stace should think that he has avoided the intuitionism and absolutism upon which all value theory depends. In ethics at any rate, "absolutism" does not mean a preoccupation with the Absolute; it means that in the moral life there is something outside ourselves – outside our natural impulses, sentiments, and desires – that stands waiting to be grasped. Prof. Stace's notion of "happiness" is absolutistic in this sense, for it is something beyond the actual, something which *is* most truly satisfactory although it may not *appear* to be so. That our knowledge of this true happiness hangs upon experience, individual and racial, does not alter the situation in the least. The fact that an *a priori* must be discovered experientially does not prevent it from being a genuine *a priori*, genuinely obligatory for all men; and the idea of "happiness", as Prof. Stace himself presents it, is such an *a priori*.

Various reasons might be given for the author's failure to recognize this point; but two reasons at least are plain. The first is that Prof. Stace has not fully emancipated himself from Rousseauism. He still views man as "naturally good". Now, if men did really seek true happiness by nature (as, for example, they seek the satisfactions of food and sex), then Mr. Stace's position would be fully justified. That evil is for us ultimate and inescapable, and not merely adventitious, is the one and only consideration that renders every "natural ethic" inadequate. Prof. Stace

conceives himself to be writing such an ethic, and all his prejudices and assumptions are set in that direction; but his conception of "happiness" will not fit into the naturalistic mold, because it is a better conception than he himself knows.

The second reason appears in the one brief but very significant passage in which Prof. Stace comes to grips with the objection which we have raised:

> . . . All men wish to be happy. And for all men there is but one road, the road of morality. And let it not be said by some clever person that there are men who do *not* wish to be happy. All men wish for something (else they could not continue to live). And *what* they wish for – however strange it may be, however it might make most of them miserable – is that which *they* conceive will make them happy.

So happiness is after all to be identified with what we *conceive* to be happiness, and since all men have some conception of what would make them happy, therefore all men pursue happiness as a goal! We here recall the intense subjectivism – indeed, the almost solipsism – of *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence*; and we realize how the errors and half-truths and ambiguities of modern philosophy go back to a single source – the sundering of human thought from the world it knows, and the shutting of it up within itself. If we cannot believe that sense-perception lays hold of anything outside itself, then we cannot believe that value-perception does either; both sense qualities and values, on this view, collapse into empty subjectivity. And then the only way to gain any kind of universality, in either field, is to show that the external world or the hierarchy of moral values corre-

sponds to some deep-seated "need" or impulse of human nature. The valuational defect of Prof. Stace's thought is essentially an epistemological defect, and can be corrected only by putting away the subjective sophistries of Locke and Hume and Descartes, and starting forth anew on the ground of realism.

The "low" or naturalistic view of the "need" which morality subserves has already been suggested; but it is more precisely expressed in the two final chapters, on "Why Should I Be Moral?" Where moral value is not clearly recognized as a simple object of acknowledgment, the discussion of ethical obligation will always be found to turn upon the theme of egoism and altruism; and this is largely the case with Prof. Stace. The end of moral action has been defined as happiness; but not all actions which increase happiness are moral. They must also be unselfish and just. The definition of morality includes three concepts: (1) happiness production; (2) unselfishness or altruism; and (3) justice. Altruism is being fair and just as between myself and other human beings; justice is being fair as between human beings other than myself. Of the two, justice is thus the more fundamental notion, and may be considered the genus, of which altruism is a species. In this inclusive sense, justice is "the recognition of the intrinsic equality of all persons as persons". Extrinsically, men are of course unequal, and this inequality must be taken account of in various ways; but simply *as persons* they are to be viewed as equal, and in so far to be treated impartially. (The practical difficulty here is to know where the intrinsic ends and the extrinsic begins. Is it an intrinsic or an extrinsic fact about a man that

he is my friend, and shall I thus be partial or impartial in regard to him? Practical difficulties, however, arise on the best of theories.)

In view of all this, the question "Why should I be moral?" immediately transposes itself for Prof. Stace into the question "Why should I be just or altruistic?" It being self-evident that I should seek my own happiness, why should I also seek the happiness of others? "And the answer is that this is the only way to reach *my own* happiness." This curious fact is then traced, much in the manner of the eighteenth-century moralists, to two psychological traits of our nature – sociality, and "our capacity for being made happy in some degree by the bare fact of the happiness of other persons". These traits, it is argued, are just as universal as reason, and therefore can as plausibly be made the basis of morality as reason can. The fallacy lies in the fact that "universal" is here taken in the purely extensive or empirical sense; and when so taken, the sex-impulse might as well be made the basis of morality, since it too is universal in extension. Value – the other dimension of reality from the actual and existent – is here read out of the universe, together with our obligations to realize *it* (not merely to get an impulse of our nature satisfied). And it must be thus read out, if it is not acknowledged to begin with. The really vital issue being thus disposed of, or not even considered, the modernist's argument crystallizes around "egoism *versus* altruism", where altruism itself turns out to be a peculiarly subtle kind of egoism. This Prof. Stace admits, but he sees no help for it. Satisfactions are satisfactions, and on this "low" view

morality ministers to one or two satisfactions among the rest.

It may be maintained, as I have already suggested, that *The Concept of Morals* is satisfactory as a theory of natural Ethics – that it is valid as far as it goes, and only needs to be supplemented by other considerations. In the beautiful little "Epilogue" appended to the book, the author argues something like this on his own behalf. His attitude toward the "other world" is not one of denial, but of agnosticism. Certainly agnosticism is better than the insolent nihilism of the Logical Positivists. But some of us think that at this latter day, agnosticism will be found not capable of saving our world from distractedness.

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